Washington
Post
- 02.19.2002
The
Washington Post
Securing
Central Asia
The
American interest in an expanding engagement with the Muslim states of
Central Asia is broader than the military bases those countries are
supplying to U.S. forces. In the 10 years since gaining independence
from the Soviet Union, the five republics stretching from China to the
Caspian Sea -- Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan -- have themselves become a sinkhole of economic failure
and political repression and, consequently, a growing source of Islamic
extremism. Thanks to their proximity to Afghanistan, these countries now
are drawing money and attention from the Bush administration that, if
directed in the right way, could help save them from becoming one of the
crisis zones of the 21st century. For that to happen, however, the
United States needs to carefully balance its long-term security
interests in the region with its short-term need for bases.
Senior
administration officials say they understand this challenge. In a press
briefing last week, the State Department's assistant secretary for
European and Eurasian Affairs, Elizabeth Jones, described a recent tour
through the five republics in which, she said, she underlined to the
Central Asian rulers that "if you want to have the kind of security
that we're talking about, we have to talk in terms of specific
improvements in human rights activities . . . and expanding democratic
processes." She said she warned rulers such as Islam Karimov of
Uzbekistan that "without that, you are simply creating a generation
of people who are so disaffected that they become easy targets for
extremist organizations."
The
message is exactly right; the problem is how to make it stick. Mr.
Karimov's Uzbekistan, a nation that is in many ways the linchpin of the
region, encapsulates the challenge. Since Sept. 11, Mr. Karimov has
worked hard to make himself indispensable to the U.S. military campaign
in Afghanistan, providing an air base for U.S. planes; in return, the
Bush administration proposes to triple aid to his country, to $150
million. But Mr. Karimov may also be the greatest single threat to
long-term U.S. security in Central Asia. His brutal and indiscriminate
repression of Muslims in his country has fueled rather than wiped out
Uzbek extremist movements, while his statist economic policy has
steadily increased the country's isolation and impoverishment.
Even as
the American military presence has steadily expanded, Ms. Jones and
Secretary of State Colin Powell have pressed Mr. Karimov for a series of
modest political and economic reforms. But the State Department, unlike
the Pentagon, seems to have made little headway. Mr. Karimov staged a
manifestly bogus referendum during Ms. Jones's visit to extend his term
in office; the sole concession he offered -- access by the Red Cross to
Uzbek jails -- also was promised a year ago, but never delivered. So
far, he has not accepted U.S. proposals that he allow the United Nations
rapporteur on torture to visit his country and that he grant legal
registration to independent Uzbek human rights organizations.
Ms. Jones
was asked what consequence Mr. Karimov might suffer for rejecting these
steps. She answered that U.S. officials would be "in their office,
in their face, all the time," but would not cut off aid that
"goes to democracy and human rights groups." In fact, it seems
unlikely that Mr. Karimov, a dictator bred in the Soviet mold, would be
moved by either tactic. U.S. leverage lies in the military relationship,
the basing of U.S. troops and planes that Mr. Karimov covets -- and that
he no doubt believes would never be sacrificed by Washington on human
rights grounds. For just that reason, the Bush administration must be
prepared to link the continuance of the military relationship to
democratic change, both in Uzbekistan and in the other states of Central
Asia. As useful as the bases may be for current operations in
Afghanistan, a larger U.S. interest lies in acting now to ensure that
Central Asia does not become the next Afghanistan.