By BRENDA SHAFFER
Brenda Shaffer, research director at the Caspian studies program
at Harvard University, is the author of "Partners in Need: the
Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran" (The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy).
President Bush didn't leave much room for interpretation when he
declared Iran a part of an "axis of evil." What wasn't clear
was whether the U.S. is willing to go beyond tough rhetoric and take
concrete steps to stop Iran from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.
One of the ways for the United States to prevent Tehran from developing
these weapons is for Washington to address one of the sources of Iran's
proliferation advances: Russia. Over the past decade, various government
ministries and defense companies in Russia have contributed
significantly to Iran's advancement toward acquisition of these weapons.
Washington is beginning to forge a new strategic framework for its
relations with Moscow. This new deal should require that Russia curtail
its cooperation with Iran in areas that could enhance Tehran's ability
to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For the U.S. to succeed on this
front, it must understand the importance that Russia attaches to its
relations with Iran and offer significant trade-offs that will help
Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a momentous opportunity
emerged for U.S.-Russia cooperation. There are different explanations as
to which side is more at fault for the failure of this partnership to
develop. It is clear that both failed to demonstrate significant
consideration for the other's security needs and continued to interact
in a competitive manner.
American policymakers have been upset with Russia's cooperation with
Iran in areas that help Tehran acquire nuclear weapons. Russian leaders
have been disappointed by Washington's promotion of the expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe and its decision
to unilaterally pursue a national missile defense system.
However, it is now time for a new and mutually beneficial strategic deal
between Russia and the U.S. An important component would be the issue of
proliferation in Iran.
In the last 11/2 years, Russia has shown signs that it recognizes that
it has some common interests with the U.S. on energy and security
issues. Russia's refusal in November to cut back its oil production in
accordance with OPEC demands has prevented the world economy from
plummeting deeper into recession. In addition, Russia has removed its
active opposition to the building of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for
transport of Caspian oil.
On security issues, not only has Moscow mobilized full-fledged support
for the war on terrorism, it has permitted an extensive U.S. military
presence in Central Asia. The Russian government also has made efforts
to establish export controls to rein in some of the proliferation
activities of Russian companies.
Russia, however, has not been willing to compromise its cooperation with
Iran. Moscow views its neighbor Iran as an important partner in
maintaining stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Tehran plays
the leading role in minimizing Muslim backlash against Moscow for its
military campaigns in Chechnya. Iran and Moscow also see each other as
important "poles" in maintaining a multi-polar international
system and preventing U.S. hegemony. Thus, Moscow will be reluctant to
endanger its relations with Iran, especially if it appears that Russia
is reacting to U.S. pressure.
But a strategic reformation that includes concessions by Washington on
issues of the highest order that affect Russian national security--such
as missile defense and further expansion of NATO--ultimately could lead
to an important change in the nature of Moscow's cooperation with Iran.
As part of a new deal with Russia, the U.S. should focus on preventing
the transfer of a limited number of sensitive items that could
contribute most seriously to the advancement of Iran's nuclear weapons
programs. The U.S. should not oppose all military cooperation between
Russia and Iran, such as pacts on conventional weapons. The U.S. should
not do anything to weaken political relations between Iran and Russia,
and instead focus only on proliferation issues. Washington would benefit
from initiating quiet diplomacy with Russian President Vladimir V. Putin
on the issue of Iran, without making it seem like a Russian concession
to U.S. demands.
Bush has signaled to the world that he wants to get tough with those who
dabble with weapons of mass destruction. The administration now needs to
go beyond words and threats and work intelligently with Russia to
contain Iran's drive for such weapons.