By Jim Hoagland
Islam Karimov's harsh and pervasive repression of political
dissent has made Uzbekistan a pariah state for more than a decade. Even
in the rough neighborhood of the former Soviet republics of Central
Asia, the Uzbek president's crackdown on Islamic moderates and fanatics
alike has seemed extreme.
This is Uzbekistan, described in the laconic prose of the State
Department's admirably honest annual report on human rights, released
earlier this month:
"On October 16, in Tashkent, police arrested two brothers,
Ravshon and Rasul Haitov, on suspicion" of belonging to Hizb
ut-Tahrir, an outlawed fundamentalist organization. "On October 17,
police returned the body of Ravshon Haitov to his family, which showed
clear signs of torture; authorities informed the family he had died of a
heart attack. His brother Rasul was beaten so severely that he became an
invalid."
The report notes several dozen reported cases like this in Uzbekistan
last year. It also notes that a police investigation into the handling
of the Haitov case was opened, at least in name.
Uzbekistan's failure to move out of the Soviet era and toward modern
democracy and free markets was for 10 years a peripheral matter for U.S.
foreign policy. Now that failure is one of the most urgent items on the
Bush administration's agenda, for three overlapping reasons:
Uzbek Muslim warriors are almost certainly helping command and fight
in al Qaeda's bitter-end resistance against the current U.S. offensive
in eastern Afghanistan. The leaders of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) played key roles in promoting the rule of the Taliban
and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. They helped found and run the terror camps
there and propagate Osama bin Laden's nihilistic and savage version of
jihad. Karimov's most dangerous enemies are George W. Bush's enemies as
well.
Karimov will arrive at the White House tomorrow to be honored by Bush
for his quick decision to let U.S. planes use Uzbek air bases in the war
on terrorism. Karimov will use this rare high-profile welcome to seek
U.S. help in what he will describe as a fresh political and economic
start. Karimov has earned a hearing from the administration and the
American public. But that hearing must nonetheless be skeptical -- and
conditioned on the Uzbek's political actions at home matching his words
in Washington.
Uzbekistan and Central Asia will help establish -- for better or
worse -- a new balance between U.S. support for human rights abroad and
the price local regimes demand for help in prosecuting the war on
terrorism.
In the wake of Sept. 11, many have assumed that human rights would be
subordinated to the war on terror and would lose any meaningful role in
U.S. foreign policy. It is just possible that it will work the other way
-- that the expanding American presence in Central Asia, the Caucasus
and Africa will push repressive governments in more moderate directions.
That case is made articulately by Karimov's deputy foreign minister
and special envoy, Sodyq Safaev, who said in Washington last week that
his government has just given legal recognition to Uzbekistan's first
human rights organization in Tashkent. This is part of a modernization
drive that will include Uzbekistan's currency becoming convertible this
July, Safaev said.
"Our problem has been the nonpresence of the United States. We
needed practical steps of cooperation as well as lectures to enable us
to move forward," Safaev said of the period of isolation and
turmoil that began when Boris Yeltsin cast Central Asia adrift by
abruptly dissolving the Soviet Union in 1991.
Similar arguments, of course, were used throughout the Cold War to
justify U.S. aid and short-term fixes that turned around to bite
Americans. An example of the latter is detailed in Ahmed Rashid's
illuminating new book on Central Asia titled "Jihad." It says
the CIA helped draw Uzbeks and other Asian Muslims into its anti-Soviet
war in Afghanistan -- and was therefore present at the creation of the
al Qaeda-IMU terror nexus.
But even in the Cold War, when U.S. financial and security support
was at times lavished on murderers and thieves who possessed only
disdain for democracy, the argument contained this paradoxical truth:
The arrival of American troops, bureaucrats and/or politicians brought a
new concern and visibility for human rights and reform locally, even if
it was only to record their absence.
Sept. 11 and the war on terrorism do not bring an end to the human
rights era or, conversely, automatic progress in Uzbekistan or
elsewhere. The Bush administration will have to resist such blanket
judgments and sort out, nation by nation, those who would use American
involvement to move ahead or simply to cling to power.