By
Masha Lipman
MOSCOW --
During the past two years, Russia's largest privately owned media group,
Media-MOST, has been destroyed. Its main asset, national TV channel NTV,
has been put under government control. Another national broadcaster,
TV-6, which had remained beyond the Kremlin's grip, was shut down.
So the
government's recent takeover of radio station Ekho Moskvy, another
Media-MOST asset, was simply a matter of time. The station managed to
postpone the takeover, but after the closure of TV-6, Ekho Moskvy's
position became dangerous when it offered shelter to the TV-6 team. Soon
afterward, the disfavored TV-6 journalists were broadcasting on Ekho
Moskvy, and shortly after that, the station was notified of the imminent
takeover.
The chief
editor of Ekho Moskvy, Alexei Venediktov, announced that he'd step down
as Ekho's chief editor, and then made a bid for a new frequency, which
he was not expected to receive, given his standing with the government.
But surprisingly, the Ekho Moskvy team won a new frequency at auction,
and Venediktov vows that his new station will pursue the same
independent editorial policy the old one did for more than a decade. He
has solid means to prevent government control: 70 percent of the new
station's shares belong to the journalists of Ekho Moskvy.
How to
explain this favorable development? Some say it's a demonstration of
goodwill by the Kremlin, intended as minor compensation for past -- and
possibly future -- crackdowns on media freedom. Some point to strife
among various groups inside the Kremlin. Another factor may be
Venediktov himself: a mercurial, indefatigable and politically savvy
editor who has fought fiercely for his station's independence.
Whatever
the reason, Venediktov has won a victory for all those who care about
freedom of the press in Russia. But Ekho is a small outlet. It has an
audience of a few hundred thousand -- negligible compared with the
national TV channels, which may reach more than 100 million viewers. The
Kremlin today, unlike the Communist Soviet state, does not seek to
establish full control over every word. We still have newspapers and
magazines (including my own news weekly), online publications and minor
television outlets not controlled by the government. The Kremlin does
not mind minor dissent, as long as it may send its own controlled
message to the bulk of the Russian people.
Few in
Russia doubt Ekho's victory was, in fact, a political decision. Ekho's
journalists may be a highly professional and popular team, easily
Russia's best news radio, but they would never have won the auctioned
frequency without "permission" from the Kremlin.
It took
the government two years to gain control of the media market. The
Kremlin used a variety of intimidation techniques against two major
media tycoons, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky. Both have fled
Russia and live abroad, the bulk of their media taken over by the
government.
Having
won this war and gotten rid of their two worst enemies, Kremlin
officials can barely hide their triumph. In their public statements they
shamelessly accuse the tycoons of crimes that have never been proven in
court and brag about finally having conquered their nemeses. The tycoons
"used the media to blackmail the government," President
Vladimir Putin's aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky said recently in an interview
with a state-owned news service. "They will no longer be a
problem."
Deputy
minister of the press Mikhail Seslavinsky, in a recent speech, described
the battle between the Kremlin and the tycoons in ironic terms. The end
result, according to Seslavinsky: In the sphere of the media "the
complicated transition phase is over," and the media are
"steadily moving ahead."
The
Kremlin campaign against the two tycoons and their media has had a grave
detrimental effect on the Russian media in general. Journalists have
seen what happens to those the Kremlin regards as enemies. Most people
in the media today know better than to antagonize the Kremlin. The
result is overwhelming self-censorship and a serious decline of
journalistic standards.
Seeking
to increase its audience, radio Ekho Moskvy had established partnerships
with quite a few provincial radio stations. As soon as it became clear
Ekho Moskvy was in disfavor with the government, one provincial partner
after another informed the station's management that it would stop using
Ekho's programming. We love you guys, they would say, but we were
advised to switch to a government-owned radio station.
The
atmosphere in today's Russian media is largely marked by a desire to
demonstrate loyalty to the government. This is a sharp contrast with
Boris Yeltsin's days, when journalists enjoyed a high degree of freedom.
(Today's Kremlin aides, including Yastrzhembsky, refer to those times as
"a bacchanalia of press freedom.") Yeltsin himself, in one of
his rare recent public appearances, said: "I tolerated any
criticism, and today even a fair remark is hard to say aloud." The
Democratic Assembly, an informal association of democratic parties and
groups, gave a much more dramatic assessment of the situation:
"There's no press freedom in today's Russia," says the opening
line of its resolution issued in mid-February.
Yeltsin
expanded and codified the freedom of the press originally granted by
Mikhail Gorbachev. But "granted" is the important word here.
The Russian people did not fight for a free press; it was, like other
freedoms, given to the nation by the government, from "above."
This may be one reason why today the Russian public looks on
indifferently as the government subdues the press.
Venediktov
may be allowed to broadcast on a new frequency, but his victory will
never be solid until it is backed by public demand for a free press.
The
writer, deputy editor of a Russian newsmagazine financed by Vladimir
Gusinsky, writes a monthly column for The Post.