NED - 03.25.2004

National Endowment for Democracy

Summary: Ilham Aliyev's First 100 Days

“The New Face of Power in Azerbaijan: Assessing Ilham Aliyev’s First 100 Days in Office”

Speakers: Shahin Abbasov, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, NED; Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Echo (an independent newspaper based in Baku)

Nadia Diuk, Director, Central Europe and Eurasia, NED 

Miriam Lanskoy, Program Officer, Central Asia & the Caucasus, NED

Shahin Abbasov prefaced his review of Ilham Aliyev’s first five months in office with his conclusion that “no clear assessment” can be made of Aliyev’s intentions for internal or external policy. Aliyev himself is ambiguous – the son of the late Heydar Aliyev, Ilham was handpicked for the presidency and took victory in the disputed 2003 elections in the midst of violent protest. He has retained most of the personnel that manned his father’s long-lived regime, and posters of and articles on his father continue to proliferate throughout the capital, Baku, as if Heydar were still the country’s ruler. However, signs that Ilham will build very different foreign and domestic policies have raised expectations that he has not yet consolidated his power base well enough to appoint his own team of advisers, and make a forceful change in any one policy area.


‘POSITIVE’ DEVELOPMENTS

There have been some unexpected “positive” developments – primarily in a light liberalization of some economic policies aimed at dampening corruption and promoting free enterprise. One such move has been legislation to ensure the redistribution of some of Azerbaijan’s considerable oil wealth from its center of power – Baku – to its other regions. Abbasov also noted with some optimism that Aliyev decided against the establishment of a new public television statement, the charter for which would not have included protections for freedom of the press. Currently, there are no independent television or radio outlets in Azerbaijan, and those independent newspapers that do exist, struggle against enormous financial and political pressures, and generally have low circulation. 

Having overseen the arrests of hundreds of opposition activists following his election, Aliyev nonetheless authorized the release of hundreds of prisoners held over from his father’s last term – a strong minority of whom were considered “political prisoners” by the international community. These releases included major critics of Heydar Aliyev.

The UNDP, Council of Europe, United States government, and other bodies have welcomed these developments.


NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Domestic Policy
Unfortunately, the negative far outweighs the positive, at least at this point in Ilham’s new rule, and suppression of civil society appears more brutal under Azerbaijan’s new ruler than it had been under Heydar Aliyev. Opposition political forces – which, like the ruling elite, has seen no turnover in forces in about 10 years – has been “emasculated.” At least 80 opposition activists, who comprise most of the leadership of the main opposition group, Yeni Musavat, remain in prison. It is reported that many have been tortured. Abbasov had some criticism for the lack of unity and pragmatism of the opposition, but agreed that conditions for free speech were better under Heydar Aliyev.

The long-term results are harder to quantify, but clearly damaging: the population has lost much of its faith in Western-style democracy and in the West’s commitment to effect such a change in their country. They may look at Georgia’s Rose Revolution but they are unlikely to make useful comparisons with their own country. 

Foreign Policy
In foreign policy terms, Ilham does not appear to be as friendly to the West as his father. He has visited Paris and Moscow but not the United States (and has no plans to visit the U.S. now). He has issued a number of patently pro-Russian statements, and has stated flatly that he will not allow foreign military bases to deploy troops from Azerbaijan – a statement seemingly aimed at the United States. Soon after the election, Aliyev refused to meet with representatives of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He has just issued an invitation for a state visit by Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf, but did not attend the inauguration of neighboring Georgia’s new President Mikhail Saakashvili. 

However, the United States does not seem to have a clear policy on Azerbaijan, and that may be part of the problem. Also, Aliyev has not ruled out a long-term relationship with NATO, and is currently in talks about military cooperation with the United States. So things may improve on the foreign policy front, though they seem skewed intuitively in Russia’s favor. 


MEDIUM-TERM PROSPECTS 

The idea that Ilham Aliyev may not have a first grasp on his own rule was raised again and again in the discussion – Abbasov feels that Aliyev will likely consolidate his rule in the coming year or so; Dr. Lanskoy felt it might take up to 3 years (a la Russian President Putin’s dismissal of key Yeltsin aide Alexander Voloshin, 3 years into Putin’s first term). Another Azerbaijani opposition activist present felt that Aliyev has no firm plan and that instability may be a more imminent threat.

The consequences of a power struggle in the leadership could be as grave as the continued repression of Azerbaijan’s populace by a heavy-handed leader. The violent protests following Azerbaijan’s October election were preceded by similar protests after elections in 1998 and 2000. The most recent unrest and the whole watershed process of the last election left the opposition depleted and “paralyzed,” according to Abbasov – lacking unity and lacking many of its leaders (who were jailed in the post-election protests), and the opposition would not be able to fill a leadership void. Nonetheless, Abbasov feels that if the domestic political environment continues as it is now, “these intolerable conditions might provoke a violent response.”

Or, neighboring countries might take advantage of this weakness. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues to fester, and might open an opportunity for offensive gestures by Armenia. 

Abbasov also feels that “radical Islam” poses a real threat to Azerbaijan. He cited the recent arrest of (relatively moderate) Baku imam Ibrahimoglu, which provoked far greater protests from the imam’s primarily young supporters than what Abbasov had seen from supporters of the many jailed opposition activists. Abbasov and Nadia Diuk both described a young generation as disconnected from politics, and perhaps more easily mobilized by extremist religious rhetoric, especially given the funding and organizing potential of such groups in Azerbaijan’s neighbor states. Nearly 90 percent of Azerbaijan’s population considers itself religious, and the vast majority are Muslim (majority Shiite). Ibrahimoglu himself is a member of an Islamic group that “rivals” that endorsed by the state, and had openly criticized Ilham Aliyev for his illegal power grab, but cannot be considered a religious extremist. 

Dr. Lanskoy and Nadia Diuk pointed out that 8.8 percent of youths polled in Azerbaijan support the imposition of sharia law (poll conducted under aegis of Diuk and NED). In the same poll it was found that 27 percent of youth are unemployed. 

I asked Mr. Abbasov whether there has been any change in relations with Iran, or whether he has sensed any new tension. He said that there is no tension and that relations seem to be on track.

Summary prepared by Sarah Hutchison, NCSJ