Wall Street Journal Europe - 03.27.2001

 

The Wall Street Journal Europe

Give Central Asia a Hand

By Mark Brzezinski. Mr. Brzezinski was director for Southeastern European affairs at the U.S. National Security Council from 1999 to 2001.

WASHINGTON -- Concerns over Turkey's financial crisis and currency devaluation have been felt globally, but nowhere more acutely than in the new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. For it is through Turkey, more than any other large neighboring state, that the Caucasians and Central Asians hope one day to be connected to Europe. If Turkey's modernization and progress toward European Union membership sputters, the new Eurasian states will be left much more vulnerable to the tender mercies of Russia, Iran and China.

U.S. policy towards the Caspian region has been based on the notion that state independence will become an enduring reality when a network of pipeline and transportation routes links the region directly to the major centers of global economic activity.

The thinking is that, because the main pipelines to the region continue to pass through Russian territory, giving Moscow a strong role in determining how the new wealth is to be shared, the region remains a Russian dependency. Therefore, the cornerstone of U.S. policy has been the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan through Georgia to Ceyhan, Turkey. If the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and other transportation links are built, no single power will have a monopoly over access to the region's wealth.

Covering the Tab

But the painful truth about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline has always been that there may not be enough recoverable oil to make the project economically viable. Energy analysts estimate that the route requires six billion barrels of oil to finance the project -- and that as of now there is a guarantee of less than four billion barrels. New discoveries in Kazakhstan may put the project within reach, but the U.S. correctly expects the tab to be covered in large part by those nations that will use the pipeline. The Turkish government has concluded a contract to build its section of the pipeline for $1.4 billion dollars, and has provided limited guarantees for cost overruns.

With Turkey's economy unraveling, and with fears that Turkish banks are in even deeper trouble with investors pulling out hard currency, Turkey's contribution to the Baku-Ceyhan project is uncertain.

Considering this uncertainty, the Bush administration may have to decide if the pipeline is sufficiently important to U.S. strategic interests in Eurasia that it would commit U.S. money to make up any difference in cost, a "geopolitical surcharge" as it were. And even if the pipeline goes forward, the U.S. should consider other measures to undergird the sovereignty of the new states of Eurasia.

First, the Eurasian states have come to realize that closer cooperation among themselves is essential to preservation of their sovereignty. The U.S. should support this positive trend. In the early 1990s, personal antagonisms between leaders of the region prevented meaningful regional cooperation. The emergence of the "GUUAM" grouping, consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, provides the first truly independent Eurasian regional body. GUUAM has created the basis for successful collaboration on trade, economic, transportation, energy and security issues.

GUUAM serves as the Eurasian equivalent to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, but so far GUUAM has received minimal support from the U.S., in part because it is a counterweight to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the body Russia relies on to promote regional integration. A cooperative relationship between the OSCE and GUUAM could be cultivated, particularly in the areas of border security and economic modernization. Support of GUUAM would help these countries help themselves.

Second, Western assistance should focus on "bottom-up reform," teaching the next generation of leaders how democratic governments and market economies work. Inviting young Germans to the U.S. after World War II was decisive in building a new democratic Germany. The Library of Congress's recent program to host 2,000 local and national officials from Russia to show them how American society works is a good start, but it must be done on a broader scale, encompassing other newly independent states and Central Asia.

Third, Central Asia should be on the agenda in U.S. discussions with Iran. With the beginning of the new Bush administration, there is now more discussion of gradual improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations. This development would greatly increase global access to the region and, more specifically, reduce Russia's monopoly over pipelines. In the long run it is in the interest of the Iranians to have a belt of Islamic states to their north serving as a zone of stability between Iran and Russia. As the U.S. slowly explores a dialogue with Iran, a U.S.-Iranian discussion on Central Asia might be useful, with an eye toward developing a plan to eventually provide direct access through Iran to Western markets.

Fourth, Russia must change from being a bully in the region to being a constructive partner respectful of the sovereignty of its neighbors. Exclusion of Russia from the Caspian is neither desirable nor feasible. In fact, Russia's active economic participation in the region's development is essential to the area's stability.

Positive Collaboration

But Central Asian leaders increasingly feel that Russia is using the specter of terrorism and Islamic radicalism to regain control over the region, and that the U.S. is being co-opted by Vladimir Putin to join Russia's self-serving mission to act as Europe's shield against Muslim extremism. An example of more positive collaboration would be to involve Russian institutions in the development of Caspian energy resources, relying on Russian technical expertise and manufacturers in Caspian basin consortia.

The U.S. and Europe have an opportunity to promote a delicate regional balance in Eurasia. This would permit the gradual inclusion of the area in the emerging global economy while the states of the region consolidate themselves. The alternative is the rise of nationalism, ethnic conflict, political fragmentation and even possibly open hostilities along Russia's southern frontiers.

Bush administration policy makers might keep these wider regional concerns in mind as a new U.S. policy toward Eurasia is developed. And when deciding whether to close its doors to Turkey, European policy makers should consider the link between Turkey's evolution and orientation and the future of the Eurasian states.