Cold War Chills in Ukraine
By Jackson Diehl
Picture a country at a strategic crossroads where an unpopular and
unpleasant ruler is besieged by his opposition. He wants American
political support; in exchange, he promises to back U.S. strategic
interests in his region. He threatens to turn to Moscow if he is
spurned. The "realists" of the foreign-policy establishment
want to back him, but it's not easy: After all, there's pretty good
evidence tying him not just to large-scale corruption and electoral
fraud but to murder.
It sounds like the kind of Cold War dilemma the United States used to
face in what was called the Third World, but this is happening now, in
Europe, in Ukraine -- the center of a region where a smaller,
21st-century version of the contest for influence between Washington and
Moscow is quietly being played out. Ukraine is one of a half-dozen
unstable countries between Poland and the Caspian Sea that are torn
between the aspiration to join a prosperous and democratic Europe and
the undertow of their history as former Soviet republics -- a pull
recently reinforced by the rise of an ambitious Russian president.
You'd think their choice would be easy, but as Ukraine shows, it
hasn't turned out that way. A decade after declaring independence,
Ukraine -- a country the size of France with a population of 49 million
-- still is desperately poor, its economy hamstrung by corruption and
the monopolies of Russian-style oligarchs, its political system
dominated by former Communist apparatchiks. Since last fall, President
Leonid Kuchma, a former missile factory manager, has faced mounting
criminal allegations, including tape recordings linking him to the
murder of a journalist whose body was found beheaded.
As an opposition coalition has mounted unprecedented street
demonstrations in the capital, Kiev, both sides have dispatched
emissaries to Washington to plead for support from the Bush
administration. Kuchma's foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, was in town
last week, and his message was blunt: Ukraine's regime, he volunteered,
was inclined to believe that a one-superpower world led by the United
States "has a lot of advantages" and was even sympathetic to
the Bush administration's missile defense plans. "What weighs
more," he appealed to an audience at the Heritage foundation.
"America's national interest or confidence" in a government's
democratic credentials?
Should America make the wrong choice, Ukrainian officials are quick
to point out, an alternative is readily available. Russian President
Vladimir Putin traveled to Ukraine last month and literally embraced
Kuchma before offering a series of deals to tighten the economic and
military bonds between Ukraine and Russia. "The big problem,"
says the Clinton administration's former ambassador to the region,
Stephen Sestanovich, "is that you have got a president who is
facing a murder rap and the Russians are prepared to hold their nose and
offer him friendship."
Similar dilemmas are to be found across the region. In Georgia and
Moldova, post-Communist governments have tried, and mostly failed, to
build democracy, free markets and ties to NATO and the European Union;
now, with Russia growing stronger, they are being tugged backward.
Moldova, rejected by the European Union, recently restored to power a
Communist Party that has proclaimed its intention to build a new union
with Russia; Georgia recently gave in to incessant pressure from Moscow
and renounced a plan to pursue integration with NATO. Despite Zlenko's
overtures to the Bush administration, Kuchma complied with a Russian
demand last fall that he fire his foreign minister, Boris Tarasyuk, the
most prominent pro-Western politician in Ukraine.
Putin's aim is not to reestablish the Soviet Union but to draw such
countries as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus and Azerbaijan back into
a Russian sphere of influence -- a zone where a phone call from Moscow
can cost the foreign minister his job or, as happened last month, cancel
a regional summit meeting. Rather than extend the zone of European
integration and Western influence, this band of countries could drift
into a separate, Russian-led camp -- magnifying Moscow's leverage over
both the EU and NATO.
Does the Bush administration care about all this? That it does is
vividly demonstrated by the fact that Secretary of State Colin Powell,
who has distanced himself from peace talks between the Arabs and
Israelis, is hosting a summit meeting in Key West, Fla., this week for
the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, who hope to strike a peace
deal. Azerbaijan's president, Heydar Aliyev, is a classic strongman who
stifles opposition, steals elections, and is grooming a son to succeed
him; but his country also has large oil and gas reserves and is prepared
to allow the construction of a pipeline that would carry Caspian Sea
energy to the West by a route that bypasses Russia.
Azerbaijan's beleaguered democrats don't get very far with either
party in Washington. "On the merits we are on Aliyev's side and
shouldn't be shy about it," says Sestanovich. Putin, after all, is
also working Aliyev hard.
Ukraine offers a harder test. There is no oil there, but much
geopolitical weight, and the chances that democracy could triumph over
the apparatchiks and oligarchs are considerably greater. Powell, says a
senior official at State, wants to "find a way to resolve this in a
way that strengthens Ukraine's democracy." That seems right, but
does that mean backing Kuchma, or his opposition? So far, there is no
clear answer to that.