At
Sheremetyevo Airport and other major Russian international
gateways, departing passengers and baggage must go through
radioactivity detectors.
It's
one of the most visible signs of Russia's efforts to stem the flow
of nuclear contraband to states trying to develop atomic weapons.
But in this country of deep nuclear expertise, long borders and
fitful law enforcement, such showcase controls have limited
effect. Critics allege that they serve to mask Russia's reluctance
to stop transfers of nuclear expertise and ballistic missile
components.
"They've
stonewalled us," said Stephen Blank, a professor of national
security studies at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania.
The
dispute has left the single biggest gap in the blossoming
strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington. It's sure to
be on the agenda of the May 23-26 summit between Presidents George
W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, as it has been at every previous
presidential encounter over the last decade.
U.S.
officials say they are pressing Moscow hard on the proliferation
issue, but they won't discuss exactly what Washington is
demanding, other than an end to transfers of sensitive technology
to Iran.
The
United States alleges that Tehran is going all-out to become the
world's next nuclear power. With Russian help, the Americans
maintain, that goal is now just years away.
Russian
officials insist their nation has no interest in seeing Iran armed
with nuclear weapons. But Iran is Russia's key economic and
political neighbor in the Caspian Sea region, and is seen here as
a force for stability and a counter to growing U.S. influence in
nearby Central Asia. Moscow also appreciates Iran's refusal to
help separatist Muslims in Chechnya.
"The
Russian government, for political reasons, may be tolerating a
certain amount of leakage," said Gary Samore, former U.S.
President Bill Clinton's special assistant for nonproliferation,
now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London.
However,
Vladimir Orlov, director of the PIR Center for Political Studies
in Moscow, said the Russian government has told institutes to
severely limit contacts with Iranian scientists and to train them
only with explicit permission from the security services.
"A
very clear message has been sent by Russian officials to
facilities throughout Russia and to Russian universities and
technical institutes that `Iranians' is a bad word," Orlov
said, citing unnamed Russian officials.
Iran
denies it is seeking nuclear weapons technology.
"There
is nothing about production of nuclear weapons in the agreement
signed between Russia and Iran on use of the atom for peaceful
purposes, for generating electrical power," Gholam Reza
Shafei, Iran's ambassador to Moscow, said at a news conference in
February.
U.S.
officials decline to give concrete evidence for their accusations,
saying they need to protect their sources and methods of
surveillance.
A.
Norman Schindler, a CIA nonproliferation specialist, told a Senate
subcommittee in September 2000 only that Russian institutions had
helped Iranian counterparts with projects with "direct
application to the production of weapons-grade fissile
material."
In
a December 2001 story in The New Yorker magazine, investigative
journalist Seymour Hersch reported that Israel had handed the
United States evidence that during the previous year at least two
Russian firms had sent Iran aluminum and steel materials that
could be used for the centrifuges needed for nuclear bombs.
The
Russian government says it has limited its nuclear cooperation
with Iran to peaceful projects like the long-delayed Bushehr
nuclear power plant. In 1995, Russia contracted with Iran to
supply a 1,000-megawatt reactor and finish construction.
Although
the International Atomic Energy Agency approved, the United States
and Israel objected vigorously to Russia's participation. It's not
so much the plant that causes concern as the doors it opens in
Russia, U.S. experts argue.
"All
the contacts between the Iranian and Russian nuclear
establishments, plus all the money that's flowing from Iran to
Russia for the project, gives the Iranians access and allows them
to try to acquire from Russia more sensitive nuclear
technology," Samore said.
Analysts
from the PIR Center wrote this spring that nuclear specialists
returning from Bushehr had affirmed that "Iran's major
objective is to form indigenous skills to accelerate its nuclear
weapons program."
Russia
insists the project is legitimate. It says it also has safeguards,
chiefly the requirement that spent nuclear fuel be returned to
Russia, not kept and enriched.
"The
people working on the station now are construction specialists.
The designing is being done here, the specialists are in Russia.
Training will be here," said Vladimir Kuchinov, deputy chief
of the foreign economic department of the Nuclear Power Ministry.
Sergei
Yakimov, chief of the export control department of the Economic
Development and Trade Ministry, said there is a widespread Russian
suspicion that under the banner of fighting proliferation, Western
countries are protecting their economic interests.
U.S.
officials say the Russian leadership has not sent a clear message
to law enforcement agencies that sensitive technology transfers
must stop. U.S. experts accuse the Federal Security Service, or
FSB, of at best turning a blind eye to proliferation.
The
nuclear and missile material from military plants "isn't just
something you put in your trunk and drive off," Blank said.
"The FSB is in all these factories."
Beyond
the recriminations, some small patches of common ground are
emerging. The United States has quietly dropped its insistence
that Russia pull out of the Bushehr plant, insisting instead that
Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation end there, a senior U.S.
administration official confirmed.
Speaking
on condition of anonymity, he said Bushehr is a highly visible
project, but the real obstacle to closer cooperation is Russia's
"overall pattern of behavior."