Washington
Post - 05.22.2002
The
Washington Post
Mr.
Putin in Perspective
THE
ANNOUNCEMENT of two important security agreements between Russia and the
West and the approach of this week's summit meeting between President
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin have triggered a round of
euphoric rhetoric. It is widely proclaimed that Mr. Putin is leading
Russia to "join the West"; the Bush administration's
ambassador to Moscow, Sandy Vershbow, last week spoke of the United
States and Russia "increasingly becoming allies in the full sense
of the term." Certainly the new agreements, on reductions of
nuclear weapons and cooperation between Russia and NATO, are welcome,
even if both offer more in political symbolism than in substance. So is
Mr. Putin's willingness to cooperate with the war on terrorism. But
before the lovefest in St. Petersburg gets fully underway, it's worth
pointing out that, in both foreign and domestic policy, Mr. Putin's
state continues to differ dramatically from the democracies that are
genuine U.S. allies.
The
Russian leader has been given enormous credit for dropping his
resistance to further NATO expansion in exchange for a new mechanism for
including Russia in alliance decision-making. Yet, even as he has
negotiated this deal, Mr. Putin has been stepping up Moscow's efforts to
establish political and economic dominion over the European and Central
Asian countries outside the alliance, ranging from Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova in Europe to Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. To
preserve its influence at the expense of the West, Russia is backing
corrupt, anti-democratic and anti-Western forces all through this
"near-abroad"; Mr. Putin is single-handedly propping up
Europe's last Stalinist dictator, Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus.
Russian troops continue to occupy bases and strong points in the
sovereign states of Moldova and Georgia, despite promises to pull out.
And Mr. Putin continues to wage the brutal and bloody military campaign
he initiated against Chechnya in 1999, rejecting Western calls for a
political settlement.
Mr.
Vershbow, like other Bush administration officials, speaks of Russia's
"integration into the Western family of democratic nations."
But Russia under Mr. Putin has become less, rather than more,
democratic. Media organizations that questioned the Chechnya war were
crushed and silenced; critical intellectuals have been intimidated by a
series of bogus espionage trials. Provincial governments have been
stripped of authority and power recentralized in Mr. Putin's Kremlin.
Business tycoons have learned that while monopolistic practices are
still tolerated, political disloyalty is not.
Mr.
Putin's admirers argue that he is ahead of his elite in cooperating with
the West, and so cannot easily control these clashing policies or
others, such as Russia's continuing sales of nuclear technology to Iran.
But Mr. Putin's personal stamp is as much on Russia's handling of
Belarus and Chechnya as it is on relations with NATO; it's just that the
latter gets much more attention in the West. That doesn't mean his moves
toward strategic cooperation with Mr. Bush are not genuine. But Mr.
Putin's policies make more sense, and no longer seem so contradictory,
if they are understood not as the revolutionary steps of a Russian
Thomas Jefferson but as the more pragmatic efforts of a hard-headed
former KGB officer to restore Russian influence in the world by the best
available means. Some days that means collaborating with the world's
most powerful democracy, which in any case Russia is too weak to oppose;
on other days, it means trampling on democrats and democratic values
both abroad and at home. There's nothing wrong in Mr. Bush's striking
deals with such a leader, or in doing as much as possible to make Russia
more like a Western democracy. But it is wrong, and dangerous, to
suppose that "joining the West" is Mr. Putin's plan.