Summit
Pragmatism
THE THREE-DAY summit between President Bush and Russia's President
Vladimir Putin beginning today in Moscow will be
successful if it illustrates the virtues of normal dialogue between
two countries working out the terms for increasing cooperation.
The
treaty that the two men will be signing to reduce strategic nuclear
weapons from 5,000 or 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 is receiving
headlines, but the reductions are less than the Russians want and less
than Americans can easily afford to make. In acceding to this
US-imposed version of arms control, Putin is doing what he has done
with other potential causes of conflict with Washington: making
a virtue of necessity.
This is
the crux of Putin's pragmatism. He is not a leader who allows himself
to misjudge the cards he has to play. Since budgetary constraints and
the sorry state of the Russian Army mean that Putin can do very little
to alter Bush's plans for missile defense or NATO expansion, Putin
cuts the best deal Moscow's weakness permits him and then seeks to
change the subject to areas of crucial interest for contemporary
Russia.
Bush
will need to calibrate carefully his use of American leverage. The
trick is to exercise that leverage on issues that really matter, such
as Russian sales of nuclear power plants and missile technology to the
theocratic hardliners who rule Iran, but to be as cooperative as
possible on agenda items such as the Kremlin's ambition to join the
World Trade Organization.
To
qualify for the WTO, Russia must make many substantive reforms - in
its banking system, its implementation of commercial contract law, and
its practice of giving energy subsidies to inefficient industries.
Since it will be several years before these changes are in place,
Bush's overt backing for Russian admission into the WTO costs America
nothing for now, while it demonstrates to Russians that the path of
Putin's pragmatism need not be a one-way street.
More
immediate is Russia's pronounced wish to receive Western
private investment. There is only so much Bush can say on this issue.
He cannot oblige US or European firms to make risky business
decisions. The Russian economic recovery that is underway has to be
reinforced with more reliable guarantees against arbitrary
bureaucratic actions, erratic taxation, and mafia extortion. But Bush
can assure Russians that Americans understand the difficulties of
their transition and will do their utmost to help them become a
prosperous people living in a stable nation.
Bush
need not approve of Putin's penchant for using his security services
to silence opposition, but Bush does need to show Russians that
Putin's pragmatism will benefit them.