Moscow
Times - 05.26.2003
The
Moscow Times
How to Reinvigorate the Relationship
By Michael McFaul
To most analysts of international affairs, whether based in London,
Moscow or Washington, President Vladimir Putin's behavior during the run
up to the U.S.-led war in Iraq was very predictable. From a classic
realpolitik perspective, Putin behaved rationally. Russia had concrete
interests in the preservation of the status quo in Iraq, and U.S.
military intervention threatened those interests.
More generally, from a realist perspective, Russia -- like France and
Germany -- had nothing to gain from another demonstration of U.S.
military might.
Even if Putin, at a pragmatic level, understands that he lives in a
unipolar world dominated by the United States, he would prefer to see
the emergence of a multipolar world in which Russia is one of the poles.
His policy on the Iraq war gave him an opportunity to stand with the
so-called anti-imperialists -- a cheap normative victory for Russia that
has won few normative points from the international community in recent
years.
President George W. Bush, however, did not fully understand Putin's
behavior, because the U.S. president does not always view the world
through a realist lens. In addition to power and interests, Bush
believes that relationships between individual leaders also matter.
Rightly or wrongly, Bush believed that he had a "special
friend" in the Kremlin. In times of need, people expect support
from their friends. In his time of need in the debate before the Iraqi
war, Bush was puzzled by Putin's decision to stand together with the
French and Germans, and not with his American friend.
Bush, it must be remembered, thought that he had established a special
relationship with his counterpart in Moscow. At their first meeting in
Slovenia in June 2001, Bush went out of his way to reach out to Putin on
a personal level. The U.S. president is not a scholar or strategic
thinker -- he is a former businessman. And as a businessman, he
understands the importance of personal relationships in getting things
done. Because he had some important business with Putin at the time --
first and foremost the abrogation of the ABM Treaty -- Bush deliberately
tried to foster a personal bond with Putin during their very first
encounter. At this meeting, Bush reported, "I looked the man in the
eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. ... I was
able to get a sense of his soul."
Sept. 11, 2001, seemed to move the two presidents even closer. For the
first time since World War II, the leaders in the Kremlin and the White
House had a common enemy. In words, both Bush and Putin spoke in tough
terms about destroying terrorists wherever they may be. In deeds, the
two presidents cooperated in bringing down the Taliban in Afghanistan.
As a result of these experiences, Bush thought that real chemistry had
developed between him and Putin. Putin visited Bush's home in Crawford,
Texas, and Bush traveled to Putin's hometown, St. Petersburg. Although
we do not know what Putin actually thought about Bush as a person, we do
know that Bush was very impressed with Putin as an individual.
"Friend" was a word used by him to describe their
relationship. Importantly, Bush had not developed any such relationships
with his counterparts in German or France. On the contrary, well before
the war in Iraq, it was widely known that Bush despised both Gerhard
SchrÚder and Jacques Chirac. While Bush tried to speak with Putin
frequently, he rarely spoke to SchrÚder or Chirac.
The Bush administration firmly believes that Putin made a major
miscalculation in not supporting the U.S. position on Iraq in the
lead-up to war.
Paradoxically, however, Putin's decision not to back the war in Iraq
will not have long-term negative implications for U.S.-Russian relations
because Bush is so eager to repair his friendship with Putin.
In coming to St. Petersburg on June 1 (and spending the night, unlike
his "stopover" in France at the G-8 summit, after which he
plans to sleep in Switzerland), Bush will be signaling his mending
fences priorities as regards the countries of the "coalition of the
unwilling" -- Russia first, Germany second, France third.
Why is Russia at the top of the list? Analysts and diplomats like to
talk about the common geostrategic interests that are pushing the two
countries back together -- controlling the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and fighting terrorism top the list of U.S. foreign policy
priorities. Russia can be useful in dealing with these issues, Germany
and France less so.
But there is another political and personal reason for Bush. He needs to
patch up the relationship with Putin and re-establish the fact (or even
illusion) that the two presidents have an intimate bond and have turned
around U.S.-Russian relations after the dismal years of the
Clinton-Yeltsin era. Bush has never claimed to have a special bond with
SchrÚder or Chirac, but he did make the claim with Putin. He has a real
stake, therefore, in getting things back to the way they were pre-Iraq
crisis. Bush also needs a few successes in mending fences with key
countries after the war in Iraq, since Democratic Party presidential
candidates have already begun to criticize him for doing too much
collateral damage to U.S. international interests by the way he
conducted the war. A turnaround in U.S.-Russian relations would serve as
the perfect rebuttal to these presidential hopefuls.
So, ironically, the context is ripe for improved relations. But to do
what?
What is strikingly absent from U.S.-Russian relations is any new big
ideas which might actually signal that the relationship has recovered
from Iraq and is special. The current agenda -- Jackson-Vanik, chicken
and steel imports, visa regimes, WTO membership -- seems rather small.
Moreover, the Bush administration is totally consumed with Iraq and,
more broadly, the Middle East and therefore is unlikely to suggest any
new big ideas for the foreseeable future. Bush and his team have
undertaken a lot of major foreign policy initiatives in the past two
years. They will be content to work these marginal issues.
This creates another window of opportunity for Putin. Instead of waiting
to react to what the United States proposes -- the conventional Russian
approach to U.S.-Russian relations over the last decade -- Putin could
really seize the moment and put forward his own suggestions for grand
new initiatives. A real deal on North Korea? A creative trade halting
Russian transfer of nuclear technologies to Iran in exchange for a
massive, cooperative R&D program on missile defense?
Bush and his team will be receptive to new ideas for improving
U.S.-Russian relations. The real question is does the Kremlin have any.
Michael McFaul is professor of political science at Stanford University and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book is "Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin." He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.