Economist - 05.28.2002

 

 

Bush’s European adventure

At the end of a six-day visit to Europe, President George Bush has attended a summit in Rome marking the inauguration of the NATO-Russia Council, on which Russia's president, Vladimir Putin will take a seat. What lies behind the warmth of Mr Bush's friendship with Mr Putin?

THE new NATO-Russia Council will allow Russia to play a limited part in some NATO decision-making. Its inauguration “begins a new chapter” in Euro-Atlantic relations, according to Lord Robertson, NATO's secretary-general. Despite the inevitable hyperbole of some of the rhetoric, it is certainly true that Mr Bush's tour of Europe has demonstrated how much transatlantic relations have been transformed in recent years, and especially since September 11th. To some observers, it even seems that America now enjoys better relations with Russia than it does with its old allies in western Europe.

Partly to counter that view, Mr Bush on Monday visited the scene of a past triumph of transatlantic solidarity. The symbolism could hardly have been cruder, nor more poignant. An American president, sniped at by Europeans for his perceived unilateralism and bellicosity, paid tribute at a graveyard containing the remains of thousands of American servicemen who died in the liberation of Europe in 1944. Mr Bush wanted to remind Europe that far more unites it with America than divides it, and that, as he put it on Sunday, “we still fight people who hate civilisation”. Jacques Chirac, the French president, was at pains to echo these sentiments, speaking of the fight for freedom “that is a fight we all engage in; a fight that is a bond between the peoples of both sides of the Atlantic.”

It seems odd, so soon after Europe rallied behind America in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, that the leaders should feel such reminders necessary. Yet, on this tour of Europe, it is the Russian leg which has seemed the most important to Mr Bush.

When the cold war ended in 1991, Russia seemed relevant to America only because it had nuclear weapons. As that nuclear arsenal was reduced, Russia’s importance would surely shrink too. After all, Russia’s economy was about the size of Portugal’s. Without nukes, that fact would tell. While Russia would plainly matter a little more than Portugal to America’s geostrategists—its regional interests stretch from the Baltic to the Bering Strait—it would become a second- or even third-order country.

It would be replaced, at least from America’s point of view, by rising China and rich Europe. The challenge of China was obvious to all, and remains so. But to some of the camp-followers of the older George Bush, the president at the time, the opportunity for Europe was no less striking. With its shared democratic values, an even larger economy (the single market opened in the beginning of 1993) and, with luck, a single foreign policy, Europe, led by Germany, could become the most important partner in the New World Order.

To begin with, the younger George Bush seemed to accept parts of that doctrine: his advisers talked about Russia only in nuclear terms. Not any longer. The meeting at which he signed the three-page Treaty of Moscow at the Kremlin on May 24th, was his fifth get-together with Vladimir Putin in less than 12 months. Mr Bush spent three days in Russia, but barely a day each in mainland Europe’s two largest economies, Germany and France, whose leaders he is meeting for the first time on home soil. With Mr Putin, Mr Bush has “looked into the man’s soul”; by contrast, he has, until this trip, seemed to have difficulty even looking Gerhard Schröder and Mr Chirac in the eye.

With the exception of Tony Blair, whom Mr Bush seems to regard as an honorary American, the Europeans often seem like wallflowers at the Kremlin ball. America’s relations with Russia are now better than at any time since the end of the second world war and are improving, while transatlantic relations seem shaky.

Mr Bush's reception in Berlin, the city of John Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner”, shows how misguided is one commonly espoused view in the American media—that Russia now loves America more than Europe does. Yes, his arrival was accompanied by hostile demonstrations. But the only reason why protests in Moscow were so much smaller was the deterrent effect of Mr Putin’s more heavy-handed security services. Yes, the elites of Germany, France and every other European country harbour plenty of anti-American sentiments: they have sneered at Mr Bush’s “unilateralist overdrive” and fumed at America’s backing for Ariel Sharon, Israel’s belligerent prime minister. But none of them can hold a candle to Russia when it comes to being rude about American foreign policy—or, for that matter, when it comes to anti-Semitism.

Similarly, Mr Bush’s warmer feelings for Mr Putin cannot be explained solely by Russia’s exemplary behaviour after September 11th. Mr Putin certainly won points by refusing to kick up a fuss about either American bases in Central Asia, or Mr Bush’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. But those perfidious Germans and French also rallied round America, invoking for the first time Article 5 of the NATO treaty (on mutual self-defence) and stepping up intelligence co-operation.

Indeed, the difference in warmth has largely been on America’s side. While the administration made relatively little of NATO’s offer of military help in Afghanistan, though it would have been easy to accept, Mr Bush happily agreed to Mr Putin’s demand to enshrine the mutual nuclear-arms reductions in a verifiable treaty, casually abandoning his strong preference for a gentleman’s agreement by handshake. Which leads to an uncomfortable conclusion: that Mr Bush’s people really do think Russia has more to offer America than any other country.

In the world after September 11th, Mr Putin has three reasons to command Mr Bush’s attention that western Europe (often mercifully) cannot match. First and most important is nuclear security. This reflects Russia’s weakness. The biggest danger facing the United States is the threat that terrorists will steal weapons-grade plutonium, or radiological material for a dirty bomb. Russia is the most likely source. Of course, the new missile treaty will reduce that threat—but only a little and over ten years. For the foreseeable future, America must rely on the Russians to guard thousands of warheads—and, if Russia cannot guarantee that on its own, America will have to help. In contrast, Mr Bush can take the safety of French nuclear weapons for granted.

Second, Russia is the world’s third-largest oil producer and has the world’s largest gas reserves. It is the country best able to reduce America’s dependence on oil from the Gulf. If (a big if) it can increase oil output at current rates for five years, it could outstrip Saudi Arabia as an oil exporter. That would increase America’s freedom of action in the Middle East (something conservatives in America are whispering about).

Third, Russia is needed in the war against al-Qaeda. Russia has closer ties with all the “axis of evil” countries than has Europe, so it is a better conduit for diplomatic pressure. And although the Europeans can be relied upon (more or less) to do what America wants in the war on terrorism, Russia cannot, quite. In Iran, for instance, it is helping to build a nuclear reactor. Left to itself, it might provide Iran (which it regards as a responsible Central Asian power) with nuclear fuel, not too many questions asked. In exchange for closer ties with America, though, it might impose stricter controls on fuel supplies.

This new appreciation of Russia is thus mostly based on the country’s shortcomings. Short-term opportunism on Mr Bush’s part could be very useful. But longer-term alliances are based on trust—swapping intelligence and so on. Those are things that the Europeans do without bidding, let alone treaties. Pray that they do not conclude that the only way to make Mr Bush love them is to stress their differences with America still more.