It is all
the more remarkable, therefore, that last week's summit was one of the
warmest meetings between US and Russian leaders in recent memory. Before
coming to power, Bush advisers ridiculed Clinton for being too close to
Yeltsin. But as president, Mr. Bush relies heavily on his personal
relationships for making foreign policy. He has deliberately tried to
forge a personal bond with his Russian counterpart since their first
meeting in June 2001. The personal bonds grew even stronger after Sept.
11, when both men came to believe they were engaged in a common struggle
against terrorism.
Last
week's summit produced tangible results. The two leaders signed an
arms-control agreement that will decommission thousands of nuclear
weapons over the next decade. This accord, combined with the formal
retiring of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in June, punctuates the end
to arms control as the focus of the relationship. Bush and Putin toasted
a new relationship between NATO and Russia in advance of the formal May
28 launch of the new NATO-Russia Council. Finally, Bush and Putin made
joint statements about their shared understanding of the war on
terrorism, as well as commitment to cooperate on missile defense.
So why
the big reversal in Bush's thinking?
Most have
attributed this amazing transformation to Sept. 11. This is partly
correct. In Bush's view, the battle against terrorism is a
black-and-white issue, and Bush appreciated Putin's unequivocal decision
to join the right side. Others point to Bush's personal fondness for
Putin to explain the change in policy. This is partly correct as well.
Sept. 11
and Putin's personality, however, are only parts of the story.
The
bigger force for cooperation originates in Moscow. For nearly two
decades, Kremlin leaders have pursued the same basic strategy toward the
West: integration. Gorbachev started this new trajectory by emphasizing
the "common European home"; Yeltsin deepened it; Putin has
continued it.
From
Russia's perspective, there have been hiccups along the way, such as
NATO enlargement, the 1998 financial crisis, and Kosovo, but these
challenges to integration have been temporary. The Soviet and Russian
leaders initiated fundamental transformations of Russian political and
economic institutions, and these internal changes have triggered a new
Russian foreign policy.
Leaders
in Washington have played an important role in encouraging the process.
Beginning with George H.W. Bush and continuing with Bill Clinton, US
policymakers in the 1990s embraced the effort to integrate Russia into
the West. George W. Bush's latest initiatives do not signal a
qualitatively new approach to Russia. Rather, they represent the
continuation of Clinton's basic strategy.
Bush
should not be chastised for reversing his positions on Russia. Rather,
he should be praised for learning on the job and doing the right thing,
including agreeing to a new treaty, something his team had tried to
avoid. Moving beyond the summit, however, President Bush should remember
the list of concerns about Russia that animated candidate Bush. He
cannot let his friendship with Putin or his focus on terrorism negate
those concerns.
Putin is
more autocratic today than he was two years ago, while the war in
Chechnya continues. But today, Bush utters no critical words. In his
State of the Union speech this year, Bush boldly pledged that
"America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of
human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state;
respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and
religious tolerance." While Bush and his administration are rightly
pushing these demands in Afghanistan, they have shown little interest in
furthering these principles in Russia.
Bush has
rightly reembraced integration as the basic strategy toward Russia. He
may soon discover, just as Clinton did, that the doctrine of integration
does not resolve all issues in Russian-American relations.
• James
Goldgeier is director of the Institute for European, Russian, and
Eurasian Studies at George Washington University. Michael McFaul is a
Hoover Fellow and professor of political science at Stanford University.
They are completing a book on US-Russian relations to be published next
spring by the Brookings Institution Press.