Washington Post - 07.15.2001

 

 

The Washington Post 

Iraq: A Dark Spot on Putin's Soul

By Jim Hoagland

What does one world leader see when he looks into the soul of another? Not everything, if President Bush's self-proclaimed peering into Vladimir Putin's spiritual makeup last month is any guide.

Hidden away in one corner of Putin's soul was the intention to derail Bush's diplomatic offensive to streamline U.N. sanctions on Iraq. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell were blindsided by Russia on Iraq before and after the Bush-Putin meeting in Slovenia.

Were Bush and Powell misled, or was Putin misread? Either way, the outcome of the first important practical test of Russian-American cooperation under Bush is no cause for confidence as the American and Russian presidents gear up for their second encounter, which occurs in Genoa, Italy, this week.

Bush now must decide if he will hold Putin accountable for the clear thwarting of Powell's first important diplomatic effort, or extend the charm offensive the two presidents waged on each other at Brdo Castle in mid-June.

As a candidate last year, Bush made a cogent case that the Clinton administration had repeatedly failed to draw a clear line around important U.S. goals abroad and to deal forcefully with nations that challenged those goals. His Genoa meeting with Putin, on the sidelines of the Group of Eight summit, tests Bush against his own campaign standard.

This is the larger issue that emerges from Russia's determined and transparent campaign earlier this month to block Powell's "smart sanctions" plan in the U.N. Security Council. The repercussions in and between Washington and Moscow outweigh any fallout in Baghdad from this diplomatic dispute. Credibility -- of Putin, Bush and Powell -- is at risk.

Saddam Hussein and the neighboring states that he has bought off with oil exports were never going to cooperate with Powell's essentially unworkable sanctions plan, which was strongly debated inside the administration. The White House offered only tepid support, and Powell has been left to cope with the stigma of its failure on his own.

In a series of prickly responses to adroit questioning on Iraq from Tim Russert on "Meet the Press" on June 3, Powell blasted "critics" for not understanding that he had already secured agreement from Russia and other Security Council members that a new system of smart sanctions would go into effect on July 4.

But the U.N. resolution he cited did not support that unequivocal statement. And diplomatic sources aware of the Security Council negotiations disputed Powell's interpretation as well when I asked them. Russia was still backing Saddam's objections to the plan, in private as well as in public.

Richard Boucher, Powell's spokesman, reiterated to me on June 4 that the United States had obtained commitments from the "highest levels" that Moscow would vote with the United States for the new system in early July.

"This distances the Russians and the French from the Iraqis," Boucher said when I expressed continued skepticism. "We are united on this, and pointed in the right direction." Equally positive administration statements continued after the Bush-Putin meeting.

Those statements and Bush's lavish praise for Putin in Slovenia counted for naught when the vote came on July 3. Russia threatened to use its veto. The United States folded and accepted a five-month continuation of the sanctions system Powell had denounced and set out so vigorously to sweep aside.

"We are still working on the Russians," Boucher said last week. "We do have the support of four of the five permanent members of the council and still want to get a new sanctions resolution passed." He declined further comment.

Diplomats and politicians constantly play word games with each other, the press and the public. It is part of their trade and their mission. I cannot exclude that misunderstandings, willful or otherwise, played a role in this case.

And presidents must put in perspective other nations' snubs, unexpected reversals or betrayals. I do not mean to suggest that at Genoa Bush should forgo cooperation with Putin on Macedonia, ballistic missile threats or other issues because Powell was stiffed by the Russians on smart sanctions.

But the president, Powell and their aides should reexamine the factors that led them to ignore the public statements and easily obtained private warnings from serious diplomats that they were misreading Moscow. There seemed to be an element of rushing past indicators that contradicted what Bush and Powell said they wanted to happen.

Putin seems to have read Bush at their first meeting as a man whose forgiving nature, bolstered by a strong desire for a deal on missile defense, gives the Russians room to maneuver on Iraq, and perhaps elsewhere. Putin goes into the Genoa meeting with momentum, and more firmly in Saddam's corner than ever. That's a dark spot that should jump out on any X-ray of any soul.