New York Times - 07.20.2001

 

The New York Times  

The Risks and Rewards of Ranch Diplomacy 

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Act II of the most intriguing and potentially important diplomatic drama of George W. Bush's presidency will unfold this weekend in the Italian seaport of Genoa when Mr. Bush renews his unexpected friendship with President Vladimir Putin of Russia.

Last month in Slovenia Mr. Bush surprised even his closest advisers by transforming his initial meeting with Mr. Putin from a starched, carefully scripted exchange of views into a cordial and informal conversation. When it ended, Mr. Bush unhesitatingly told the world that Mr. Putin was "very straightforward and trustworthy" and that he had looked the Russian leader in the eye and "was able to get a sense of his soul."

"We share our love for our families. We've got common interests," Mr. Bush gushed.

The effusive performance brought snickers from some veteran diplomatic practitioners, who wondered whether Mr. Bush, relatively unschooled in world affairs, had fallen for a calculated charm offensive by a man who loyally served the K.G.B. before entering Russian politics. The history of relations between Washington and Moscow is stained with the broken expectations of American leaders who thought they could unlock the humanity within Kremlin rulers. Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy found that personal chemistry didn't work with Nikita Khrushchev, and even Bill Clinton's warm embrace of Boris Yeltsin never yielded the predictable and stable relationship between the two nations that Mr. Clinton sought.

But there have been occasions when amicable personal relations played a helpful role, most notably during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and Mr. Bush's father. In the 1980's and early 1990's, Mr. Reagan and the elder Mr. Bush engaged Mikhail Gorbachev in a productive dialogue that was built in part on the friendship that the men developed.

The historic diplomatic achievements of those years, including important arms control agreements, the peaceful unification of Germany and the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, were also made possible by the mutual trust that formed between the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and two secretaries of state, George Shultz and James A. Baker III.

As George W. Bush heads into his next meeting with Mr. Putin, it is far from clear whether Mr. Bush can create an equally constructive relationship. It is always possible that Mr. Putin was insincere in their first discussion, but even discounting that, the question lingers whether one two-hour meeting could be sufficient to reach such an unclouded judgment about Mr. Putin's character and intentions.

Mr. Bush has great faith in his ability to read and relate to people, and he has often relied on his winning personality to help sell himself and his programs to the public. He may, indeed, have detected an honesty and set of shared interests with Mr. Putin that can serve as the foundation for a mutually profitable relationship, one that can be advanced by personal gestures such as inviting Mr. Putin to be a guest at his ranch in Crawford, Tex. Most Americans surely hope that is the case.

Yet the future of relations between America and Russia seems at least as likely to rest on more tangible factors. Here, too, the prospects for progress are unpredictable. Certainly, Mr. Putin's policy moves since his meeting with Mr. Bush in Slovenia have not been in keeping with the spirit of that encounter. In quick succession, he warned that Russia would rearm its missiles with multiple warheads if the Bush administration built a missile shield, his United Nations envoy blocked an American effort to modify sanctions against Iraq, and this week Mr. Putin signed a friendship treaty with China that commits the two countries to oppose many of Washington's international security policies.

These may be short-term maneuvers. But they demonstrate that national interests ultimately determine the course of diplomacy. When Mr. Gorbachev was the Soviet leader, national interests and historical forces set the stage for the agreements he reached with Mr. Reagan and Mr. Bush's father. The Soviet economy was declining, Moscow's influence abroad was waning and Mr. Gorbachev was looking inward as he tried first to reform Communism and later to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet state.

Today, democratic Russia is a weakened but still proud power, eager to hitch its economy to the West but wary of American domination and willing to oppose Washington when it believes Russian interests are threatened.

If Mr. Bush hopes to make "some fabulous history" with Mr. Putin, as he told Peggy Noonan of The Wall Street Journal last month, he will have to pursue policies that offer some common ground for discussion. That means, among other things, remaining faithful to his stated commitment to work with the Russians in establishing a new framework for nuclear arms, including missile defenses, rather than brushing off Moscow's concerns. Mr. Putin seems ready to seek a compromise if Mr. Bush acts responsibly.

Mr. Bush's instinct to befriend Mr. Putin and to write a positive new chapter in relations with Moscow can be a powerful force in shaping American diplomacy, but only if Mr. Bush devises policies to match and keeps his administration, including the Pentagon, united behind them.