Ukraine: Eleven Years - 08.23.02

 

"Eleven Years of Ukrainian Independence: A Watershed?"

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Briefing

Dr. Nadia Diuk, Director for Central Europe and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy

Dr. Diuk would not describe the current period as a “watershed” in the development of independent Ukraine. Discussions of Ukraine since 1991 have tended to be prefaced by “is Ukraine turning to the West or to the East?” and the present time is no different. Over the past two years, however, Ukraine's political future has become cloudier.

Dr. Diuk assessed the progress of Ukraine from three pillars necessary for the establishment of a viable state: 1. constituted statehood (the establishment of administrative statehood, including an army, independent judiciary, currency, language, flag, etc) 2. independent economy 3. political pluralism

Establishing Statehood

Ukraine managed to constitute itself as a state much more quickly than anticipated by observers in 1991. As the second largest state in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine was perceived as inseparable from its larger, culturally close neighbor Russia. Ukraine’s population is nearly 30% ethnic Russian - not counting those listing Russian as their primary language - and, like Russia, predominantly Orthodox. Moreover, Ukraine has very little pre-Soviet history as an independent state after which it could pattern itself in 1991.

President George H.W. Bush’s “Chicken Kyiv” speech of 1991 reflected an international lack of confidence in Ukraine’s ability to successfully break free of Russia. Ukraine’s “suicidal nationalism,” it was feared, could cause deadly conflict with Russia, another nuclear state. The contended status of Crimea (Crimea had been “given” to Ukraine by Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Kruschev in 1954), another flashpoint, would only contribute to a very ugly breakup. Barring this, many predicted, Ukraine would simply rejoin Russia. Of course, Ukraine managed far better than predicted - it retains Crimea, has destroyed its nuclear holdings with Western support, and its sense of national identity is strong.

Recently, the Ukrainian government has expressed its wish to join the EU and NATO. Western reception of these statements has been skeptical but positive - and it is clear that Ukraine feels pressured by Russia’s recent pact with NATO.

Economic Prospects

Ukraine’s very rosy economic outlook helped spur separation from Russia - Ukraine was the Soviet Union’s breadbasket and had a substantial industrial infrastructure. Nonetheless, Ukraine was the only breakaway state to hold a referendum on this independence in December 1991, the same day its first presidential elections were held.

Ukraine decided to take a slower approach to economic reform than did Russia, which modeled its ‘shock therapy’ strategy on that of the Eastern European states formerly in the Soviet orbit - Poland and Czechoslovakia. As is now apparent, a slow transition from a command to a market economy allows massive corruption to take hold. Practically, then, Russia has fared better than Ukraine given expectations. Ukraine’s continued resistance to foreign investment, very late acquiescence to land privatization, and use of tax inspections as a political tool continue to stunt and reverse gains made in the past decade, despite some GDP growth in the past 2-3 years (also experienced by Russia).

Political pluralism

Politically, Ukraine is now ruled, as one audience member described, by those who should have been the “losers” of the 1991 elections. Going in, the leaders of the popular democratic movement Rukh polled a high percentage of the electorate, but the less dynamic Leonid Kravchuk ultimately won the election. The president has far broader powers than does the Russian president and although Ukraine has not turned into a pure autocracy as the Central Asian states have, nonetheless the “power vertical” is far more apparent in Ukraine than in, say the Baltics and Caucasian States, where parliamentary democracy or something close to it predominate.

Now Leonid Kuchma, who gained office in 1994, seems to be trying, through his control of regional leaders and administrative outlets such as the courts and media, to retain power by all means necessary. He can be seen as a “spent force” in such actions as this week’s renewal of charges against opposition politician Yulia Tymoshchenko - lacking in political vision, Kuchma can only cage in his competition.

March 31 Parliamentary Elections

While political parties in Ukraine are still associated more with personalities than with specific ideologies, the electorate appears to have become more sophisticated since 1991, and did not appear to be fooled by presidential manipulation of pre-election campaigns. The same cannot be said of the Russian electorate, who seems to have elected Yeltsin and Putin simply because their enormously well funded campaigns completely overran those of their opponents.

Kuchma attempted to overrun the campaigns of his opponents by stacking the field with pro-Kuchma candidates, unfairly allocating administrative resources such as the media, and by coercing or bribing regional officials, labor unions, teachers, and all those in the pay of the state to vote pro-Kuchma.

The March 31 parliamentary elections brought about lively campaigning from pro-presidential, opposition, and unaffiliated parties. Clearly, ousted Prime Minister Vladimir Yushchenko is the most popular politician in Ukraine today, and though he is widely perceived as reformist, pro-Western, and independent of Kuchma, nonetheless he never proclaimed himself in “opposition” to Kuchma. In popular voting, Yuschchenko’s Our Ukraine won the majority, beating out Kuchma’s For United Ukraine and the Communists. The beleaguered Tymoshchenko bloc and others received just enough to pass the 4% threshold for a small share of parliamentary seats. Nonetheless, proportional voting brought in a majority of “independent” candidates who later joined the Kuchma faction, making this faction dominate over Yushchenko’s and the Communists.

Dr. Diuk believes that the independents would change affiliation fairly easily if they felt it was to their advantage.

Civil Society

The media is increasingly feeling pressure to self-censor; this represents a dramatic shift from the media’s strong sense of freedom in 1991-1994. The problem encompasses a lack of foreign investment in Ukrainian media outlets, and examples of direct harassment by government - including the Georgiy Gongadze case [President Kuchma is alleged to have ordered the beheading of this controversial journalist in mid-2000. The issue sparked major popular demonstrations in 2001-2002].

Apart from the media, Diuk characterized civil society as a “bright spot” in the Ukrainian outlook. In the last 2-3 years there has been a boom in grassroots organizing, and especially when compared to civil society in Russia, appears sophisticated and strong.

Two NGO Congresses were held in Ukraine in 2002 (February and June), and though President Kuchma and other government officials were absent, NGO representation was broad and there was active discussion between the groups. This in comparison to Russia’s NGO Forum of November 2001, which hosted Putin and other government figures, and which exceeded expectations in that it included many different NGO groups, but also included many “GONGO”s (government-sponsored NGOs). Dr. Diuk characterized Ukrainian civil society as generally more “independent” than that of Russia.

- Reported by Sarah Hutchison, Program Assistant