OSCOW,
Sept. 20 — As American military operations move toward what could be
the first deployment of Western troops on former Soviet soil, Russia's
policy of giving the Western war on terrorism full moral support — and
so far not much else — is about to hit a dead end.
What the
Kremlin does next in Central Asia has the potential to alter relations
with Europe and the United States, for better or worse, for years to
come. The Russians are clearly anguished by their options.
Foreign
Minister Igor S. Ivanov hinted at the Kremlin's latest direction on
Wednesday in Washington when in one sentence he appeared to abandon
Moscow's opposition to the placement of Western military forces in the
Central Asian nations of the former Soviet Union, which Russia still
regards as its strategic backyard.
"Each
country will decide on its own to what extent and how it will cooperate
with the U.S. in these matters," he said.
Not a
week earlier, the defense minister, Sergei B. Ivanov, had said that
there was "no basis for even a hypothetical possibility" of
Western forces' being stationed in Moscow's former fief.
Either
choice is a fateful one for the Russians, who have been trying for a
decade to recast themselves in a European mold and are now beginning to
learn that such a decision comes at a price.
Russia
was the first nation to console the United States after the Sept. 11
terror attacks, and has been unswerving in its verbal support for the
elimination of radical Islamic terrorism, seen by Moscow as the chief
destablizing force on its southern borders, particularly in the
breakaway republic of Chechnya.
But it is
the Central Asian nations of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which border
Afghanistan, that are the first concrete test of Moscow's unity with
Washington and the West in any antiterrorism campaign.
The
United States wants access to those lands — and in the case of the
more independent Uzbekistan may already have it — for the sorts of
short-notice military missions, from search-and-rescue to special
operations, whose success rests on surprise or speed.
Russia
still sees matters differently. Whatever its shared antipathy toward
terror, it regards an American military presence as a threat to its
considerable influence in the region. Nationalists see such a presence
as a humiliation that would give the United States a lasting foothold in
Russia's hinterland.
Worse
still, many officials fear that American strikes launched from former
Soviet territory will inevitably draw Russia into a broader conflict
whose goals it may share, but for which it is unprepared — and against
which it is unprotected.
Russia is
effectively Tajikistan's defender against the Taliban, with a large
Russian contingent on the Afghan border. It is bound by a treaty to
defend nearby Turkmenistan, also bordering Afghanistan, from outside
attack.
Russians
still bear the scars of the 1980's war in Afghanistan, which led to a
humiliating withdrawal for the Russian Army after it failed to subdue
the Afghans. That war was followed by vicious civil conflict in
Tajikistan after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Thousands were
killed, and as many as 300,000 people, many of them ethnic Russians,
displaced in fighting between Islamic forces and the government.
As one
expert noted in an interview today, the Russian Army already is
conducting one fruitless war against Islamic extremists in Chechnya.
There, the current conflict erupted after the insurgents made incursions
into another Russian republic, Dagestan, and — Russian authorities say
— blew up apartment buildings in Moscow and other cities, killing more
than 300 people.
Two
fronts may be both beyond the resources of the military and other
Russian security forces, and the nation's patience.
"Russia
is far more vulnerable to terrorist strikes than the United States
because of geographic, political, economic and other reasons,"
Aleksei Arbatov, a member of the Russian Parliament and a leading expert
on the military, said this week.
"If
Russia joins the U.S. and becomes a target for terrorists, no matter
what forms their activities take, then Russia will have every right to
seek a U.S. obligation to ensure its security. Otherwise these relations
will not work."
Moscow's
fear of being dragged into a wider war is not an idle one.
Russia
keeps 10,000 troops on Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan and 15,000
within the country, largely to cope with drug smuggling and the constant
threat of an Islamic insurgency by extremists of the Taliban school.
Beyond
that, Russia has a sizable Muslim minority of its own, and a large
Muslim population on its southern border, in Kazakhstan, that could be
destabilized by any disintegration of Afghanistan.
Others
here believe Russia and the United States cannot cooperate in Central
Asia regardless of any security guarantees. The chairman of the foreign
affairs committee in Parliament's lower house, Dmitri Rogozin, said this
week that American use of Russian military bases in the region was
impossible "because Americans may turn them into their permanent
residence."
That is a
popular view among the military and an influential slice of strategists
who want to see Russian abandon any Western course and regain its
historic role as an independent Eurasian power.
But the
cost of staying on the sidelines in this conflict, others argue, could
be far greater.
Dmitri
Trenin, a top scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Moscow Center, is a leading advocate of closer ties to the West. He
argued in an interview today that the antiterrorism campaign offers the
Kremlin a blue-moon chance to win Western trust and cement itself into
European security arrangements — all by committing to a war whose goal
it supports, and which it most likely cannot avoid in any case.
Western
nations do not need Russia's money or its military clout, both of which
are in short supply these days. But what Russia could offer — a
strategic location and influence with Afghanistan's neighbors, for
starters — is dearly sought.
Finally,
he said, by throwing its lot with the West, Russia would gain at least
some say in the United States' conduct of a war it desperately wants to
contain. In any event, Russian opposition alone may not be enough to
keep the United States military out of Uzbekistan and, perhaps, other
Central Asian states as well.
Shireen
Hunter, a leading Central Asia scholar at Johns Hopkins University,
predicted that the Kremlin would decide to support the Western
coalition. "The question is how far they are willing to go to do
that," she said.
Russian
willingness to allow its Central Asian allies to support the war, she
said, will provide one of the first clear indications.