Current History - October 2002

George W. Bush and Russia

By James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul

James Goldgeier is director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, and adjunct senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations. Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, associate professor of political science at Stanford University, and senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are completing a book on United States policy toward Russia after the cold war.

The group of foreign policy officials that advised Texas Governor George W. Bush during the 2000 presidential campaign declared the Clinton-Gore approach to Russia a total failure. Their central criticism, especially when expressed privately, was not that President Bill Clinton had done too little to promote markets and democracy in Russia and the subsequent integration of Russia into the Western community of democratic states. Instead, they argued that Clinton and his team had devoted too much time and too many resources to trying to change Russia internally. As for integrating Russia into Western international institutions, Bush's foreign policy advisers expressed indifference during the campaign, and instead emphasized the need to strengthen the "core"-that is, American allies in Europe and Asia-rather than expanding the core to peripheral places such as Russia. 

Bush's team did not advocate neglect of Russia. The candidate's foreign policy team-a group called the Vulcans and headed by Stanford professor Condoleezza Rice-believed the best way to repair United States-Russian relations was to begin to treat Russia like an international power. They advocated greater focus on the "national interest." This implied, in their view, more attention on the balance of power in the international system and among the great powers, such as Russia and China, and less attention to "humanitarian interests" and lesser powers, such as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Bush campaign adviser Robert Blackwill explained that Bush planned to focus on Russia and China and "not Haiti, not Somalia" because these were countries that could threaten American national security interests. "The reality is that a few big powers can radically affect international peace, stability, and prosperity," Rice wrote in a January-February 2000 Foreign Affairs essay during the campaign. Rice also recognized the importance of promoting American values in foreign affairs, which she described as "universal." 

Greater attention to great powers with nonliberal values did not mean a softer line. On the contrary, in reference to both Russia and China, Bush and his campaign officials promised to depart from the Clinton strategy of accommodation and adhere instead to "tough realism." The Bush team promised to end the romanticism that Clinton's Russia team held for Russia. For Bush's advisers, Russia was still a great power, but one in decline, which made it erratic and dangerous. As Rice wrote in Foreign Affairs, "Moscow is determined to assert itself in the world and often does so in ways that are at once haphazard and threatening to American interests." Bush advisers promised to end the "happy talk" and discontinue the overpersonalized approach they claimed Clinton practiced with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. "The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton administration's embrace of Yeltsin and those who were thought to be reformers around him has failed," Rice stated bluntly and emphatically throughout the campaign. Clinton's team, in Rice's view, mistakenly let its Russia policy become "synonymous with the agenda of the President of Russia." Bush advisers also threatened sanctions if Russia continued to supply Iran with nuclear technologies and pledged not to consider Russian interests in dealing with European security matters or American strategic interests more generally. In particular, candidate Bush made clear that he planned to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty or attempt to amend it to allow for the building of national missile defense, no matter what the Russian position on the issue. He also pledged to unilaterally lower the United States nuclear arsenal to levels dictated by American interests alone, which meant there was no need to consult the Russians or slow the process by signing treaties with them. Because members of the Bush foreign policy team were realists, they tended to downplay the importance of regime type and internal politics generally and instead focused on the external behavior of states, which they believed were influenced first and foremost by the balance of power in the international system. Generally, they pledged a similar approach to Russia. According to Rice, "the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide." During the campaign, Rice recommended that the United States should not get bogged down in Russian internal developments, but instead "must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia." In one presidential debate, Bush stated even more bluntly: "The only people that are going to reform Russia are Russia [sic]. They're going to have to make the decision themselves."

This said, two internal problems in Russia-corruption and Chechnya-were simply too juicy politically to ignore. Candidate Bush and his advisers repeatedly touched on these issues and blamed the Clinton administration for not doing enough in responding to them. In his one major foreign policy speech of the campaign, Bush described Russia as a power "in transition" whose final regime type was still unknown. Echoing Wilsonian themes, Bush argued that "dealing with Russia on essential issues will be far easier if we are dealing with a democratic and free Russia." In supporting reforms in Russia, however, Bush stated emphatically that "we cannot excuse Russian brutality. When the Russian government attacks civilians-killing women and children, leaving orphans and refugees-it can no longer expect aid from international lending institutions. The Russian government will discover that it cannot build a stable and unified nation on the ruins of human rights. That it cannot learn the lessons of democracy from the textbook of tyranny. We want to cooperate with Russia on its concern with terrorism, but that is impossible unless Moscow operates with civilized restraint."¹ Four months later, as the following exchange on February 16, 2000 between candidate Bush and journalist Jim Lehrer during The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer demonstrates, Bush promised to do more regarding Chechnya.

JL: On Chechnya and Russia, the U.S. and the rest of the Western world had been raising Cain with Russia from the beginning, saying "You are killing innocent civilians." The Russians have said essentially, "We're fighting terrorism, and, by the way, mind your own business." What else-what else, if anything, could be done by the United States?

GWB: Well, we could cut off IMF aid and export/import loans to Russia until they heard the message loud and clear, and we should do that. It's going to be a very interesting issue to see how Russia emerges, Jim. This guy, Putin, who is now the temporary president, has come to power as a result of Chechnya. He kind of rode the great wave of popularity as the Russian military looked like they were gaining strength in kind of handling the Chechnya situation in a way that's not acceptable to peaceful nations. . . .

JL: But on Chechnya, specifically, you think we should not-we should hold up International Monetary Fund aid. Anything else we should do?

GWB: Export/import loans.

JL: And just cut them off?

GWB: Yes, sir, I think we should.

JL: Until they do what?

GWB: Until they understand they need to resolve the dispute peacefully and not be bombing women and children and causing huge numbers of refugees to flee Chechnya.

JL: And do you think that would work?

GWB: Well, it certainly worked better than what the Clinton administration has tried.

JL: You mean, just using words, you mean?

GWB: Yes.

Candidate Bush, his campaign, and his campaign supporters also tried to make corruption in Russia-and Clinton and Gore's inattention to it-a campaign issue. Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin had developed a close personal relationship during their years of service as cochairs of the United States-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, often referred to as the "Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission." According to Republican critics of Gore, the vice president had allowed his personal relationship with Chernomyrdin to blind him to the corrupt practices of the Russian prime minister. In 1995, when Gore was said to have received a CIA report linking Chernomyrdin with corrupt practices, he allegedly returned the report with the word "bullshit" written across the top of the document.² Five years later, Bush and others reminded the American voters of Gore's intimate relationship with this reputedly corrupt Russian official. In a 2000 presidential debate, Bush claimed that Clinton policies fueled corruption: "We went to Russia, we said, 'Here's some IMF money,' and it ended up in Viktor Chernomyrdin's pockets and others'. And yet we played like there was reform." At the same time, reporters revealed that Gore had signed a secret agreement with Chernomyrdin in 1995 that allowed Russia to continue to sell conventional weapons to Iran until December 31, 1999, a deadline the Russians had ignored. 

The Cox report, a Republican investigation of Clinton's Russia policy by a committee chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (R.-Calif.) and published on the eve of the 2000 election, went even further, accusing Gore of deliberately trying to cover up widespread corruption within the Russian government. Commenting on the epithet allegedly scrawled on the CIA document, the Cox report concluded, "It is difficult to imagine a more dangerously intemperate reaction by the vice president to official corruption in Russia."³ Based on other testimonials, the Cox report suggested that "[i]t is therefore clear that the vice president rejected not an initial report unsupported by other evidence, but rather a detailed report built on extensive earlier work by the CIA of which Gore must have been aware. 

Moreover, the allegations against Chernomyrdin were made in the context of numerous charges against other senior Russian leaders-suggesting widespread corruption at the top levels of government." The Cox report also accused the Clinton team of failing to "mount an aggressive challenge to organized crime in Russia." Candidate Bush never embraced a causal connection between Russian crime and American foreign policy, but he and his campaign staff did endorse the general characterization of Russia as a lost cause, burdened by imperial proclivities from its past and criminal undertows in its new present. Despite the efforts of the Cox team and others, Russia-and foreign policy in general-never became a major issue in the 2000 campaign. Candidate Bush's statements on Russia were not the product of strategic thinking, but oversimplified campaign slogans. Before becoming president, in fact, little evidence suggests that Bush had devoted a great deal of time to thinking systematically about foreign policy. Only the actual practice of policy revealed his true intentions toward Russia. 

From Confrontation to Reengagement

In the first weeks of his administration, President Bush and his new foreign policy team signaled their intention to maintain a tough line on Russia and Chechnya in particular. After being named national security adviser but before taking office, Condoleezza Rice wrote an opinion piece for the Chicago Tribune in which she restated many themes of her Foreign Affairs essay from a year earlier. In the December 31, 2000 newspaper column, Rice emphasized again that "the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power" and therefore "U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia." At the same time, she also reiterated many of Russia's domestic ills, including weak democratic institutions, half-hearted economic reforms, and corruption. She devoted special attention to the ill effects of the Chechen war and Putin's role in it: "As prime minister, Vladimir Putin used the Chechnya war to stir nationalism at home while fueling his political fortunes. The Russian military has been uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation-an unwelcome development in civil-military relations.

The long-term effect of the war on Russia's political culture should not be underestimated. This war has affected the relations between Russia and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin has been hurling charges of harboring and abetting Chechen terrorists against states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence." Rice hoped that this blunt statement about Russia's problems and their impact on United States interests would stand in contrast to the sugar-coated rhetoric of the Clinton years, which, in her opinion, greatly damaged United States national security: "Frustrated expectations and 'Russia fatigue' are direct consequences of the 'happy talk' in which the Clinton administration engaged."

In spring 2001, Bush and his foreign policy team did seem determined to end the "happy talk." In March his administration ordered the expulsion of nearly 50 Russian diplomats from the United States, who were accused of being spies. Bush personally did not make any statements about Chechnya in his first months in power, but his State Department sent a loud signal of support for the Chechen cause by arranging a meeting between the Chechen foreign minister in exile, Ilyas Akhmadov, and the acting head of the State Department's Bureau of Newly Independent States, John Beyrle, the highest-level meeting ever with a Chechen government official. In this early period, Bush officials also seemed poised to maintain a tough line on Russia's relations with rogue states. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called Russia an "active proliferator" while Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz described the Russians as immoral proliferators, who "seem to be willing to sell anything to anyone for money." As Wolfowitz explained, "My view is that they have to be confronted with a choice. You can't have your cake and eat it too. You can't do billions' worth of business and aid and all that with the United States and its allies, and then turn around and do small quantities of obnoxious stuff that threatens our people and our pilots and our sailors." 

Leaks from the White House suggested that assistance to Russia would be reduced. A new, more confrontational approach to relations with Russia seemed to be emerging. As Jane Perlez concluded in her review of Russia policy in the March 23, 2001 New York Times, "The Bush administration has not articulated a broad policy toward Russia, but in thoughts and deeds it has taken a sharp departure from the engagement policies of its predecessor, moving toward isolating Russia and its president, Vladimir V. Putin."

More generally, Bush also hinted that the promotion of democracy might be a major component of his foreign policy agenda. For instance, in introducing his future secretary of state, Colin Powell, Bush stated clearly that "our stand for human freedom is not an empty formality of diplomacy but a founding and guiding principle of this great land. By promoting democracy we lay the foundation for a better and more stable world." If applied to Russia, this statement implied a greater focus on, not neglect of Russia's internal problems. 

At the same time, Bush and his team suggested that addressing the bilateral relationship with Russia was not a top priority. Adopting a policy line that contradicted its earlier statements on the need to focus on great powers, the new administration said that engaging and strengthening relations with America's allies were a greater and more immediate concern. Only at the insistence of American allies in Europe did Bush agree to schedule a meeting with Putin as a final stop on his first trip to Europe in summer 2001. Symbolically, the Bush administration also downgraded Russia's place within the foreign policy bureaucracy by dismantling the Bureau of Newly Independent States within the State Department that Clinton had created. In the new organizational chart at the State Department, Russia was one of 54 countries in the new Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Rice initiated a parallel reorganization at the National Security Council, folding the directorate on Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia affairs into a new one encompassing Europe and Eurasia. 

The Demise of "Tough Realism"

"Tough realism" toward Russia did not last long. Like his father in 1989, Bush ordered a major review of United States policy with Russia. Even before this was completed, however, Bush's new approach toward Russia emerged. Instead of confrontation and neglect, Bush decided to reembrace the policy of engagement with Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin. Rather than departure, this decision signaled continuity with Clinton's Russia strategy. 

As the June meeting with Putin in Slovenia approached, Bush began to become personally involved in his Russia policy for the first time. In spring he made a strategic decision that he would not confront Putin with a laundry list of American concerns. Instead, he wanted to establish a personal rapport with the Russian leader as a necessary first step in developing a partnership with his Russian counterpart. It was a businessman's approach to foreign policy. 

With this decision, Bush was pursuing a strategy similar to Clinton's, but for different ends. Clinton had embraced Yeltsin because he believed Yeltsin the best hope for Russian reform. In helping his Russian friend, Clinton believed he was also aiding Russian internal reform. Bush's objective in reaching out to Putin had little to do with Russian reform because he had a different set of foreign policy goals. The new American president wanted to avoid long discussions or arguments about Russian internal politics. Instead, the security agenda trumped all other concerns. In particular, Bush wanted to establish a relationship with Putin to secure Russia's acquiescence to American withdrawal from the ABM treaty. At the time, many critics of Bush, in Europe especially but also in the United States, warned that United States withdrawal from the treaty would produce a cataclysmic break in United States-Russian relations. Bush and his foreign policy team were determined to abrogate the treaty without derailing United States-Russian relations. Doing so required less focus on Russian internal flaws and more on the security agenda between the two countries. Now that the presidential campaign was over, Bush was returning to the realist inclinations of his closest foreign policy advisers-inclinations that were also shared by his father. 

At their first meeting in Slovenia in June 2001, Bush went out of his way to praise Putin. Instead of depersonalizing relations with Russia, Bush deliberately tried to forge a personal bond with his Russian counterpart. At this meeting, Bush reported, "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. . . . I was able to get a sense of his soul"; he liked what he saw and sensed. According to White House staffers, Bush and Putin did discuss Chechnya privately, but almost no mention was made of the issue publicly. 

Nor did Bush mention publicly the issue of press freedoms, which Putin had done so much to limit in his first year in office. Instead of a public rebuke on the press issue, the Bush administration decided to work on this concern privately. While in Moscow the following month, Rice took time away from her main agenda-the death of the ABM treaty-to meet with representatives of the Russian press. The roundtable was not a press conference but a frank discussion of the future of the independent media in Russia. According to participants in this meeting, Rice expressed understanding of the issues and sympathy with the "opposition" representatives. But no concrete policy changes resulted from this meeting or any other between United States officials and representatives from the Russian opposition media. Eventually, the Bush administration did establish a media initiative, an exchange between American and Russian press executives whose noble aim was to foster the political independence of the Russian press by securing financial independence for independent media outlets. No concrete projects of assistance-rhetorical or otherwise-have resulted yet from this program.

September 11

The bond between Bush and Putin grew even stronger after September 11. Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to call Bush that day to communicate his full support for the United States and the American people. Putin expressed sympathy as a leader of a country that also had suffered from acts of terrorism against civilians in the capital. Putin then followed his words of support with policies of assistance. On September 24, 2001, Putin announced a five-point plan to support the American war against terrorism. He pledged that his government would share intelligence with its American counterparts, open Russian airspace for flights providing humanitarian assistance, cooperate with Russia's Central Asian allies to offer similar airspace access to American flights, participate in international search-and-rescue efforts, and increase direct assistance-humanitarian as well as military-to the Northern Alliance, the guerrilla army opposed to the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan. 

Putin's agreement to an American military presence in Central Asia represented a historic change in Russian foreign policy. Before September 11, President Putin had vacillated between pro-Western and anti-Western foreign policy stances. Putin had pushed through the Russian parliament ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; expressed a clear desire for Russia to become a fully integrated member of the Group of Eight (G-8) Western industrial nations, the World Trade Organization, and, more generally, Europe; and stressed in his new foreign policy doctrine that "Russia shall actively work to attract foreign investments" and will endeavor to "ensure favorable external conditions for forming a market-oriented economy in our country." At the same time, Putin had also reached out to North Korea, Cuba, and China, and signed a major arms deal with Iran. 

Putin's personal dual impulses of seeking to integrate into the West while also trying to balance against the West reflect Russia's longstanding love-hate relationship with the West. In the wake of September 11, however, Putin seemed to lean much farther toward the West and especially the United States. His foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, compared the new situation to the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, only now "we are joined by common democratic values, and it is even more obvious that a struggle against a world threat requires the cooperation of our countries and the entire world community."

Since September 11, Bush has articulated a much clearer, simpler vision of his foreign policy. Obviously, the new defining issue before American foreign policymakers is the "war on terrorism." In Bush's view, this war has divided the world into two groups-those countries supporting the United States and those that do not. In this black-and-white world, Russia is clearly a supporter of the American war on terrorism. Therefore, in Bush's view, Russia has become a partner, a friend, and even an ally of the United States in the global struggle against terrorism. United States Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow even went so far as to declare in February 2002 that "the United States and Russia are closer today-politically, economically, and militarily-than at any time in our history."

The Disappearance of Russia's Internal Problems

Bush rewarded Putin for his immediate embrace of the right side after September 11 by changing the way he spoke about Russia's "war against terrorism." On September 26, 2001, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer communicated Bush's appreciation for Putin's statement. Fleischer also stated that the "Chechnya leadership, like all responsible political leaders in the world, must immediately and conditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups, such as Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization." The Clinton administration had previously connected some Chechen fighters to bin Laden's network; the Bush administration had not. Bush radically changed his views about the Chechen war from his campaigning days, eventually accepting Russia's definition of the war on terrorism to include Chechnya. Meetings between the Bush administration and the Chechen government-in-exile have since been downgraded. When visiting Washington in spring 2002, on the eve of Bush's trip to Moscow, the Chechen foreign minister, Ilyas Akhmadov, could not secure an official meeting with any senior United States government representative. 

President Bush's statement did not give Putin a green light to do what he wanted in Chechnya: the Russian armed forces already were doing that, with little or no reference to American opinions. The statement of support did underscore the notion that the United States and Russia faced a common enemy. Putin had been pushing this theme for years with his American counterparts. In November 1999, then Prime Minister Putin even published an opinion piece in The New York Times in which he asked Americans to "imagine ordinary New Yorkers or Washingtonians asleep in their homes. Then, in a flash, hundreds perish at the Watergate or at an apartment on Manhattan's West Side." Putin therefore was pleased to hear that Bush finally recognized their common cause publicly. 

In subsequent meetings between Bush and Putin, the war in Chechnya has not been a major agenda item. Journalist Jamie Dettmer summed up the attitude in the August 27, 2002 Insight on the News: "Bush has shown remarkable discipline in ignoring Russia's increasingly brutal campaign against separatists in the rebel republic-a campaign dubbed by Yelena Bonner, widow of Nobel Prize-winning human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, as the 'political genocide' of the Chechen people." Before meetings between the Russian and American presidents, Bush administration officials repeatedly have stressed that the issue of Chechnya is covered at length behind closed doors. When Bush has alluded to the Chechen situation publicly, however, he and senior government officials have often adopted Putin's portrayal of the Russian military operation as part of the war on terrorism. As Bush reaffirmed at the G-8 meeting in Canada in summer 2002, "President Putin has been a stalwart in the fight against terror. He understands the threat of terror, because he has lived through terror. He's seen terror firsthand and he knows the threat of terrorism. . . . He understands what I understand, that there won't be peace if terrorists are allowed to kill and take innocent life. And, therefore, I view President Putin as an ally, strong ally, in the war against terrorism." Even Secretary of State Colin Powell changed how he described the Chechen conflict, stating soon after the Moscow 2002 summit that, "Russia is fighting terrorists in Chechnya, there is no question about that, and we understand that." These remarks suggest that the references to Chechnya behind closed doors may not be as hard-hitting as United States officials have claimed.

The Bush administration has not always spoken with a unified voice about Chechnya. Although the president himself has not criticized the Chechen war since the 2000 presidential campaign, members of his administration have condemned the conduct of the Russian military operation. When pressed to talk about Chechnya, Condoleezza Rice has continued to express a nuanced view of the war: "[W]e clearly have differences with the Russian government about Chechnya. We've said to them that we fully agree that the Chechen leadership should not involve itself with terrorist elements in the region, and there are terrorist elements in the region. But [we have also noted] that not every Chechen is a terrorist and that the Chechens' legitimate aspiration for a political solution should be pursued by the Russian government. And we have been very actively pressing the Russian government to move on the political front with Chechnya."

The United States ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, has been particularly vocal in condemning the methods of the campaign, urging a political solution and distinguishing between international terrorists fighting in Chechnya and local Chechen fighters whose aim is independence. In public statements, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Steven Pifer also has stressed the need to differentiate freedom fighters from international terrorists. Pifer stated bluntly that the "danger to civilians in Chechnya remains our greatest concern. The human rights situation is poor, with a history of abuses by all sides." 

If the rhetoric of the Bush administration has changed considerably over its first two years in office-from the critical to the supportive, but with dissident voices continuing to highlight the negative-actual policy has changed very little from the Clinton era. When asked in his confirmation hearings how the Bush approach to Chechnya would differ from the Clinton policy, Powell answered, "I don't know that I can answer that." Subsequent statements by Bush administration officials suggest that the actual policy on Chechnya has changed very little. On the basic issues concerning Chechnya, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, "To reiterate, our policy has not changed. We recognize Chechnya as part of Russia." He also added that "they [the Russians] need to take steps to bring the violence to an end . . . [T]here is no military solution to the problem, and they need-both sides need to find ways to begin a dialogue and reach a political settlement." Under Bush, the United States has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the region. At the same time, administration officials have refrained from pursuing new policy initiatives regarding Chechnya. They have not embraced a more activist role in the region such as those proposed by former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, or offered American mediating services to the Russians and Chechens. 

Although little in the conduct of the war has changed since candidate Bush pledged to sanction Russia until it stops bombing "women and children" and causing "huge numbers of refugees to flee Chechnya," no sanctions have been applied. The only significant policy change is rhetorical. If Clinton begrudgingly added statements critical of the Chechen war to his talking points on Russia, Bush has eliminated them.

On Not Mentioning the "D" Word

Other issues regarding Russian internal reform also have assumed a marginal position in United States-Russian relations. Under Putin, nearly every democratic institution has become weaker, not stronger. In the Putin era, criticism of the state has proved costly. The State Security Service has stepped up harassment of investigative journalists, human rights activists, environmental leaders, and Western nongovernmental organizations and religious groups and their Russian affiliates. Putin and his surrogates have gone on the offensive against critical independent media outlets, seizing control of NTV and then TV-6-the country's only opposition networks-and firing nonconformist journalists at publications such as the popular weekly, Itogi.⁴ Putin also has weakened alternative power centers within the state. His "reform" of the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council, has emasculated this once-powerful check on presidential power. Perhaps most 
disturbingly, as demonstrated in the 2002 presidential election in the Russian republic of Ingushetia, Moscow has begun to actively engage in selecting regional governors by disqualifying candidates deemed unacceptable to the Kremlin.

Despite these assaults on Russian democratic institutions-already fragile before Putin came to power-President Bush has rarely mentioned the "d" word in public during his meetings with Putin. Instead, United States officials have explained that Bush has decided to discuss issues of democracy with Putin privately. Even concerns about freedom of the press are not discussed with the press. As with Chechnya, lower-level officials have tried to speak more publicly and critically about the antidemocratic trends in Russia. In Moscow, United States Ambassador Vershbow has spoken out repeatedly on the state's abusive use of power against independent media outlets, human rights activists, and environmentalists. Vershbow was especially vocal during the state's campaign against TV-6 in winter 2001 and spring 2002. It is true that in Washington, national security adviser Rice has made a point of meeting with democracy activists and independent journalists from Russia. And in its annual report on human rights around the world, the State Department documented in detail the scope and scale of abuses in Russia. Despite these symbolic gestures and words, however, democratic erosion in Russia has not been a top agenda issue for Bush in his execution of Russia policy.

According to human rights activists and democracy proponents in Russia, this change in policy has had negative consequences for their causes. At the beginning of the Bush administration, these groups were optimistic about the return of a Republican to the White House. Bush said the right things and appeared willing to be tough with the Kremlin authorities. Since September 11, however, Russian democracy activists have noted the change in tone in Bush's statements about Russia. Tatiana Kasatkina, executive director of the human rights group Memorial, noted that she and her associates "were not satisfied" with Bush's comments about human rights during his first visit to Russia in May 2002. "He spoke about Chechnya and human rights only in passing. There was nothing in the speech like what he said during the elections campaign." These same groups now feel abandoned. As Lyudmila Alexeyeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, explained, "The integration of Russia into the antiterror coalition became a pardon of violations by Western democracies. This ally that we [the Russian human rights movement] had in Western governments, the United States, the European Union, and Canada, is immeasurably less of an ally now." Other Russian human rights activists have complained that Bush's references to the joint American-Russian war on terrorism have given the Russian military in Chechnya even more leeway to act as it pleases. As Valentina Melnikova, an activist with the Soldier's Mothers Committee, stated in reaction to Bush's comments on Chechnya during the May 2002 Moscow summit, "We know for sure that the way he spoke about it [the war on terrorism] gives more freedom to the Russian military."

Regarding Russian economic reform, the Bush administration has had to make few policy decisions because reformers within Putin's government have proceeded with extensive economic reforms without asking for major external financial or technical assistance. Putin's team has pushed through major tax reforms, produced trade surpluses, maintained balanced budgets, and quelled inflation.⁵ In 1999, Russia recovered from the 1998 financial meltdown and recorded 5.4 percent growth in GDP. In 2000, the Russian economy grew 8.3 percent, the highest annual rate of growth in decades, but this tapered to 5.2 percent in 2001. Russia's success made decisions about aid to Russia easy. The Bush administration did not support new IMF loans to Russia during these years, because the Russian government did not request them. 

Some analysts called for the forgiveness of Russian debt owed to the United States, but the Russian government has never asked for debt forgiveness, and so the Bush administration has never offered it. Although with smaller budgets, bilateral economic assistance programs have continued under the Bush administration, they are not the focus of policy in either capital. The Bush administration dissolved the much-criticized Gore-Chernomyrdin commission and has given its blessing and support to a set of private bilateral organizations dedicated to the same set of issues pursued by Gore-Chernomyrdin. Russian economic reform, however, is not, as it was during much of the 1990s, a major issue in United States-Russian relations. Especially after September 11, Russia's internal problems disappeared from the United States-Russian diplomatic agenda.

A New Russian-American Security Agenda

Putin and his immediate circle of foreign policy advisers welcomed the return of realpolitik as the philosophy guiding United States-Russian relations. Even before September 11, this new realism embraced by both presidents helped reverse the perceived setbacks in United States-Russian relations in the latter half of the 1990s. The simple fact that both presidents were new also created a sense of optimism in the bilateral relationship. After September 11, the personal bonds between Putin and Bush and the positive ambience surrounding United States-Russian relations grew even stronger.

The new "happy talk" between presidents produced policy results. On the war on terrorism, Secretary of State Powell and other Bush officials have praised Russia as a "key member of the antiterrorist coalition." Powell asserted, "Russia has played a crucial role in our success in Afghanistan, by providing intelligence, bolstering the Northern Alliance, and assisting our entry into Central Asia. As a result, we have seriously eroded the capabilities of a terrorist network that posed a direct threat to both of our countries." United States and Russian officials have continued to echo similar cooperative themes well beyond the efforts established during the military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the June 2002 G-8 meeting, Bush praised Putin as a "man of action when it comes to fighting terror." 

Beyond Afghanistan, American and Russian actions in fighting the war on terrorism have occurred in parallel and not in conjunction with each other. In spring 2002, Russian and American officials discussed a joint operation in Georgia to root out Al Qaeda operatives allegedly camped in the Pankisi Gorge area. Eventually, American armed forces were deployed in Georgia, but not accompanied by their Russian counterparts, who are not perceived as allies by the Georgian government. Russian and American officials differ on how long American troops should stay in Central Asia. Russian parliamentary speaker Gennady Seleznov has warned that "Russia will not approve of permanent U.S. military bases in Central Asia." The Bush and Putin administrations also have not agreed on a definition of terrorism or a course of action when discussing Iran or Iraq. Despite its new alliance with the United States, Russia has refused to stop selling nuclear technology to Iran. Officially, Russia has remained opposed to a military attack against Iraq. And Russian officials have accused the United States of "double standards" for pushing for democracy in Iraq and Iran but not in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Nonetheless, the degree of understanding about security threats to both the United States and Russia from third parties-whether states or organizations such as Al Qaeda-was never greater than in the wake of September 11.⁶

In addition to cooperation (or at least a shared vision) on terrorism, Bush and Putin took advantage of the new warm relationship between their two countries to finally complete unresolved security issues from the previous decade. On arms control, the Bush administration failed to secure Russian approval for amendments to the ABM treaty, which would have allowed the United States to deploy national missile defense. Instead, on December 13, 2001, Bush officially notified Moscow of his intention to withdraw from the ABM treaty, which occurred six months later. Putin as well as many other Russian officials repeatedly stated their disapproval. But the withdrawal announcement had no discernible negative consequences for the bilateral relationship. Five months later, the two presidents signed the Moscow Treaty on nuclear weapons during Bush's first visit to Moscow. The two-page treaty committed both countries to reduce their nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012 (Bush originally did not want to sign a treaty, proposing instead a handshake or a memorandum of understanding; the signing of an actual treaty that had to be ratified by American and Russian legislators was a concession to Putin). 

Although the treaty represented the largest reduction in strategic nuclear weapons ever codified in an international agreement, critics of the treaty have rightly noted that the treaty does not obligate either country to actually destroy the nuclear warheads. Rather, the treaty requires both sides to remove these warheads from their delivery vehicles. The Bush administration has acknowledged that the Pentagon intends to store 4,600 warheads in a "responsive force," since the American capacity to reproduce these warheads is limited. But most treaties signed between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia were more illusion than real reductions.

Bush and Putin also have initiated several important steps that should eventually resolve lingering security concerns regarding Europe. Bush's courtship of Putin helped make the second round of NATO expansion a nonevent. Even as a presidential candidate, Bush had stated consistently that he intended to continue to enlarge NATO and was not going to allow Russia a veto over candidate countries. At the same time, the Bush administration reestablished a special relationship between NATO and Russia by creating the NATO-Russia Council, a new institutional arrangement ratified by NATO members in Rome in July 2002. Russian membership into NATO, once considered a subject too ridiculous even to mention, is now discussed as a real possibility in the distant future. Disagreements-most notably about Belarus-still exist, and competition-most strikingly over the future orientation of Ukraine-remain. But after September 11, the once-distant goal of a Europe "peaceful, undivided, and democratic" no longer seems so remote. 

Finally, Bush and Putin have cooperated to push the agenda of Russian integration into Western international institutions beyond NATO. In summer 2002, the G-8 leaders agreed that in 2006, Russia would assume the presidency and host the group's annual summit. According to the White House, "The decision reflects Russia's economic and democratic transition in recent years under President Putin." President Bush also has stated emphatically that he wants to facilitate Russia's speedy entry into the World Trade Organization. To promote membership, his Department of Commerce declared Russia a market economy in spring 2002. To aid Russian economic integration, Bush also called for Russia's graduation from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, although his administration has failed to convince or cajole Congress to change the legislation.⁷ In some economic sectors such as steel and poultry, Bush policy actions impeding United States-Russian trade have trumped these rhetorical pledges in support of Russian economic integration. But overall, Bush's basic economic and security policy impulse toward Russia has been one of integration.

Integration without Transformation

Midway through his first term in office, Bush's Russia policy looks very similar to Clinton's. Both American presidents sought closer relations with Russia. Both pushed for Russian integration into the West. During his first two years as president, Bush may have joined greater results from pursuing this policy-Russia seems more integrated into the West and closer to the United States in 2002 than in 1999-but the basic strategy pursued by Bush was not distinct from Clinton's, or from President George H. W. Bush's. Beginning with the elder Bush and continuing with Clinton, United States foreign policymakers in the 1990s embraced Russian integration into the West as the objective, and engagement of Russia as the strategy to achieve this. George W. Bush's strategy toward Russia does not signal a qualitatively new approach. Rather, his policy represents the continuation of Clinton's basic strategy. After all, Clinton talked with Yeltsin about reducing strategic nuclear weapons to below 2,000 warheads, but never closed the deal. It is a deal, however, that Clinton or Gore would have signed in a heartbeat. Likewise, the new Russia-NATO pact looks like the old Russia-NATO Charter from 1997.

The approaches of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush differ in one important way. Whereas Clinton and his foreign policy team recognized democratization and marketization within Russia as preconditions for full-scale integration into the Western community of democratic states, Bush does not. Like Clinton and his father, George W. Bush pushed for integration of Russia into the West. Unlike Clinton but similar to his father, Bush does not believe that Russia's internal transformation must precede Russia's external integration into the Western clubs. Bush does not emphasize Russian internal reforms, and defines a very small role for the United States in facilitating the process of Russian internal reform. Regarding Russian democracy, which has eroded considerably during his first two years in office, Bush rarely has mentioned Russia's problems, let alone propose policies that might address them. 

Why the major reversal in Bush's thinking on Russia? Most have attributed this amazing transformation to September 11. This is partly correct. In Bush's view, the battle against terrorism is a black-and-white issue. Putin made the clear choice to wear a white hat, and Bush appreciated his unequivocal decision to join the right side. Some in Washington even believe that the Russian reaction to September 11 has been more sympathetic to the American cause than those of some NATO allies. But September 11 is only part of the story. Well before the terrorist attacks, Bush already had decided that he would abandon the policy of "tough realism" and instead work to cultivate a personal relationship with Putin and a cooperative relationship with Russia. This new approach was clearly apparent at the first Bush-Putin summit in Slovenia. 

At the beginning of all new administrations, whatever the previous administration did is deemed wrong. This was true for the Bush team in the first months of 2001. Yet as it began to think more strategically about American interests with Russia, the Bush administration realized that a Russia inside the Western community of states was better for the United States than a Russia outside this community. Bush also realized that his own security agenda-including first and foremost the abrogation of the ABM treaty-could be achieved more easily with a cooperative rather than confrontational relationship with Russia. 

Putin's own thinking and behavior must be included as part of the explanation for this shift. A different leader in the Kremlin might have reacted more negatively to an American president who abrogated the ABM treaty, pushed for the expansion of NATO to include former Soviet republics, and stationed American troops in Central Asia. Often in history, great powers-and especially great powers in decline-have banded together to balance against an expanding hegemon. Putin might have pursued the formation of a new anti-American coalition among Russia, China, and even Europe to act as a counterweight to the United States. Instead of pursuing this balance-of-power strategy, Putin opted to stay the course of integration. Instead of balancing against the United States and its allies, Putin's Russia has tried to join with the Western community of states. 

For nearly two decades, Kremlin leaders have been pursuing the same basic strategy toward the West: integration. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev started this new trajectory (remember his phrase, a "common European home"), Yeltsin deepened it, and Putin has continued it. From Moscow's perspective, there have been hiccups along the way-NATO expansion, the August 1998 financial crisis, Kosovo-but these challenges to integration have all been temporary. Integration into the West changed from a slogan to a policy after the Soviet and Russian leaders initiated fundamental transformations of Russian political and economic institutions. These internal changes triggered a new foreign policy. On first coming to office, Putin toyed with a different approach. Some in his entourage actively encouraged a less Westerncentric direction to foreign policy. After some initial hesitation, Putin recommitted Russia to a policy of integration into the West. September 11 further reaffirmed his strategic choice. Although Putin still faces many domestic critics of this pro-Western orientation, Bush's decision not to make Russian internal reform a precondition for Russia's Western integration or for closer ties with the United States has made Putin's decision to lean Westward much easier.

¹ Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Calif., November 19, 1999.
² Although refusing to comment on this revelation, Gore advisers maintain that the vice president generally complained about the vagueness of the charges against Chernomyrdin.
³ Russia's Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People (Washington: U.S. House of Representatives, September 2000), p. 79.
⁴ Masha Lipman and Michael McFaul, "'Managed Democracy' in Russia: Putin and the Press," Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 117-128.
⁵ For an overview of positive and negative trends in the Russian economy, see especially the set of articles published by the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Russia's Uncertain Economic Future: Compendium of Papers (Washington: Government Printing Office, December 2001).
⁶ Although never discussed publicly, China constitutes another shared threat-or more precisely "future" threat-that has helped strengthen the bond between the Russian and American presidents.
⁷ Thirty years ago, Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D.-Wash.) and Congressman Charles Vanik (D.-Ohio) cosponsored an amendment to the 1974 Trade Act that linked the Soviet Union's trading status to levels of Jewish emigration. Russia eliminated state controls on Jewish emigration over a decade ago, but the American legislation has not yet been amended.