Russia
Journal - 10.08.2001
The
Russia Journal
New
Red Wave Starts Rolling
By
Dimitry Pinsker
Whether
out of a sense of helplessness or incompetence, presidential analysts
and spin-doctors always talk of Communist successes in the regions with
concern. The most the Kremlin-dwellers have done so far though is to
identify the problem and give it an eloquent name – the "new red
wave."
What is
happening with the Communists is indeed surprising. The Kremlin hasn’t
succeeded in toppling them in their traditional heartlands of Central
Russia and the North Caucasus. Critics may cite the case of Ulyanovsk,
but this doesn’t count: Communist Yury Goryachev, who tried building
developed socialism in a single region, was replaced by a "Chechen
war hero" General Vladimir Shamanov, who now and then attempts to
introduce something reminiscent of War Communism.
As if
this wasn’t enough, the Kremlin has let the Communists expand their
influence in the regions. Traditionally liberal Nizhny Novgorod elected
Communist Gennady Khodyrev as governor. Irkutsk and Rostov-on-Don
narrowly avoided a similar fate only because the acting governors used
the full might of the administrative resources to stop it. In Rostov,
the Communist candidate was struck from the list just a few days before
voting. In Irkutsk, the incumbent governor snatched a victory from his
Communist rival by an extremely slim margin, which probably only
appeared in the final hours of vote counting.
And these
places are not provincial backwaters of the likes of Tula or Ivanovo.
These are major intellectual and industrial cities, which by Russian
standards are performing quite well. Traditionally, voters in these
regions have supported if not the right-wing parties, then at least the
"party of power."
The
Communist successes are all the more glaring given the Kremlin team’s
string of victories against the Communists at the federal level. The
Communists have lost much of their influence over key decision-making
processes in the last six months. The fights in the Duma over the Land
Code last summer and the unauthorized demonstrations in Moscow during
debates on the Land and Labor Codes bear this out. At that time, the
Kremlin’s reaction, though not public, was rapid and straight to the
point – either the Communists got back into line, or they faced losing
their Duma committee chairmanships.
This was
a serious threat. Holding the chair of a Duma committee is valuable not
just as a source of administrative influence and a chance to get party
officials budget-funded jobs, but also as a source of party funding –
as payment for lobbying services.
The
autumn Duma session has so far seen the Communists keeping a much lower
profile – proof of their increasing weakness as a political force. The
Duma had no problems passing the Land Code, and two weeks later even
voted on it again, just to dismiss any possible accusations of
procedural violations. The 2002 draft budget also passed its first
reading without any particular problems.
But
despite the fact that the Duma now has an unquestionably loyal
presidential majority, ready to pass whatever laws the president wishes,
the Kremlin is still holding off with key laws that have always caused
controversy among the left-wingers – most notably the trade in
agricultural land. The new Land Code doesn’t apply to agricultural
land.
Possible
explanations for this cautiousness in the Kremlin are that the left
still has a certain influence on the government and Kremlin apparatus,
which is responsible for drawing up key documents, and the traditional
fear of provoking an outright conflict with a still-powerful opposition
party.
The
results of the latest round of regional elections are what makes it
possible to say the Communists still retain some power. And the
National-Patriotic Union’s assembly last weekend showed that the left
is full of fighting spirit and able to make a sudden change of course
when necessary.
Several
times during his speech, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov used the
expression "nationwide discussion" when talking about this or
that cause dear to the left’s heart. Zyuganov said it was imperative
to work more actively in the regions with ordinary people.
"The
time has come to identify the causes for people’s passivity and to
more accurately predict forthcoming events," said Communist Party
ideologue Ivan Melnikov. "This means we have to figure out how to
turn passive protest into action."
To
strengthen their positions outside the Duma, which had been the left’s
main playing field, the Communists don’t even necessarily have to
resort to "action" or enter into a head-on collision with
Putin personally. The average voter isn’t highly politicized,
doesn’t follow Moscow political intrigue very closely, and doesn’t
see a great difference between Putin and the Communists.
This kind
of voter goes more by symbols and words. Putin has expressed respect for
the left in words and has spoken warmly of the Communist Party. And he
has also backed his words up with deeds, chief among them being the
decision to return the Soviet national anthem, something the left
couldn’t have dreamed of under Boris Yeltsin.
The
paradox of this situation is that the Communists could follow the
strategy of stubbornly drumming into people’s heads the banal old idea
of the good tsar – in this case Putin – who is really "our
man," and the evil Boyars, the German Grefs and Anatoly Chubaises,
who feed the tsar all sorts of liberal-bourgeois lies.
If the
Communists succeed in cementing this image in voters’ minds, it will
be that much harder to stop the new red wave from rolling further.